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FRENCH RETIREMENT SYSTEM
I. INTRODUCTION
From the standpoint of longevity, these are the best of times. At no other
point in our history have Americans known such lengthy life spans.'
Yet this increased longevity is helping to create the worst of times for our
nation's social security system. Principally because of increasing life
expectancy and the fact that the baby boom generation is reaching retirement
age3 and is followed by a much smaller generation, the American social
security system is facing a long-term funding deficit.5 The Board of Trustees
of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors and Disability Trust Funds predicts that
unless corrective action is taken, social security benefits will exceed dedicated
When the American social security system began paying monthly benefits in 1940, 65
year old men had a life expectancy of 12 years and 65 year old women had a life expectancy of
13 years. By 1998, life expectancy for 65 year old men reached 15 years while life expectancy
for 65 year old women was just over 19 years. Moreover, the Board of Trustees of the Social
Security Trust Funds predicts that by 2075, 65 year old men will have a life expectancy ofjust
under 19 years while 65 year old women will have a life expectancy of 22 years. See Kathryn
L. Moore, Raising the Social Security Retirement Ages: Weighing the Costs and Benefits, 33
ARiz. ST. L.J. 543, at 574 (2001) and authorities cited therein.
' This Article will use the term social security in its generally accepted meaning in the
United States as referring to cash benefits provided by the United States' Old-Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. See Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of
Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 131, 131 n.2 (1998). In France, the term
generally has a much broader meaning; typically, it refers to benefits for family, sickness, and
work injuries as well as old-age benefits. See CouRs DES COMPTES, LA SICURTI SOCIALE 5
(2000); DidierBlanchet & Louis-Paul P616, Social Security andRetirement in France, in SOCIAL
SECUiTY AND RETIREmENT AROUND THE WORLD 101, 111, at n.3 (Jonathan Gruber & David
A. Wise eds., 1999). See also JEAN-JACQUES DUPEYROUx, DROIT DE LA StCURt SOCIALE 92-
97 (13th ed. 1998); JEAN-PIERRE CHAUCHARD, DROIT DE LA ScICURITI SOCIALE 15 (2d ed.
1998).
' The eldest of the baby boom generation will reach the earliest eligibility age for social
security retirement benefits (age 62) in 2008. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SOCIAL SECURTY:
DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY 18 (1998) [hereinafter
DIFFERENT APPROACHES].
4 See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, FINANCING THE RETIREMENT OF FUTURE
GENERATIONS: THE PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 6 (1998) ("Following World War II,
there was a dramatic increase in fertility rates in the United States. Rates began to soar in 1946
and, although they peaked in 1957, their effect on annual birth rates persisted until 1964.
Following the post-war increases, fertility rates plummeted and, since the early 1970s, have
remained below zero population growth.").
For a comprehensive discussion of the reasons why the American social security system
faces long-term funding difficulties, see id. at 6-10.
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tax revenues by the year 2016, and the social security system will become
insolvent, that is, unable to pay benefits in full, by the year 2038.
The United States is not alone in facing these circumstances. Industrialized
countries throughout the world are facing similar challenges7 and reforming
their retirement systems in response to them." The experiences of these
foreign countries can provide important guidance for the United States as it
considers reform of its social security system.9 Indeed, the House Ways and
6 2001 ANN. REP. OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND
DISA. INS. TR. FUNDS 2 (referring to the combined OASDI trust funds and using intermediate
assumptions) [hereinafter 2001 ANN. REP.].
"According to currently available projections, in industrial countries, particularly in
Europe, the population age structure is expected to change dramatically over the next fifty years
as a result of a decline in birth rates, an increase in life expectancy and a reduction in the scale
of migration, with possible consequences on the financial viability of pension schemes."
GIULIANO BONOLI, THE POLITICS OF PENSION REFORM: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY CHANGE IN
WESTERN EUROPE 14 (2000). "Increased life expectancies, accompanied by a surge in births
following the Great Depression and World War II, portend enormous strains on public
retirement programs around the world. The World Bank estimates that the number of people age
60 and over will triple between 1990 and 2030, placing particular stress on already-developed
nations in Europe, Asia, and the Americas." Social Security Reform Lessons Learned in Other
Countries: Hearing Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 106th Cong. 2 (1999)
[hereinafter referred to as Lessons]. See R. Kent Weaver, The Politics ofPensions: Lessonsfrom
Abroad, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 183,
185 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998) (noting "[a] common set of pressures for
change-demographic pressures, budgetary pressures, competitive pressures, and conservative
critiques-have confronted pension systems in all OECD countries."); EMMANUEL REYNAuD,
LES RETRAITES EN FRANCE: LE R6LE DES RtGIMES COMPLiMENTAIRES 5 (1994) (noting that
since the beginning of the 1980s, retirement systems have entered a period of change in all the
industrialized countries). See also Jacques-Andr6 Schneider, SupplementaryPension Plans and
Collectively Agreed Schemes, in PENSIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ADAPTING TO ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 173, at 173 (Gerard Hughes & Jim Stewart eds. 2000) "Throughout
Europe, demographic and economic pressures are producing often painful reassessment of the
prospects for pensions." Id.
' See BONOLI, supra note 7 (analyzing recent pension reforms in United Kingdom,
Switzerland, and France); Lessons, supra note 7, at 2, stating:
Several countries, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, have
raised retirement ages prospectively. Others, including France, Italy, and
Sweden, have begun to implement benefit reductions. Still others, including
Chile, Mexico, and Australia, have attempted more comprehensive reforms
by shifting towards a forward-funded approach based more on personal
savings for retirement than strictly on pay-as-you-go public benefits.
9 In announcing the hearing, House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer declared:
"[M]any countries have already implemented the types of changes we are just staring to debate
in earnest. Whenever possible, we should seek to benefit from this international experience as
we proceed down our own path to reform." Lessons, supra note 7, at 2. The pension reform
experiences of other advanced industrial countries are not only of great interest in their own
[Vol. 29:441
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Means Committee recently devoted a hearing to "social security reform
lessons learned in other countries."'" Following that lead, this Article
examines recent reforms of the French retirement system to see what lessons
can be applied to reform of the American social security system."
The Article begins by giving a broad overview of the French retirement
system. It then describes the more significant reforms of the system instituted
over the last decade. Finally, it discusses the lessons these reforms offer for
reform of the American social security system.
I1. OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH RETIREMENT SYSTEM
The French take a very different approach to retirement income-and
social welfare in general-than does the United States. The preamble to the
1946 French Constitution
guarantees to all, notably to the child, to the mother, and to
old workers, the protection of health, material security, rest
and leisure. Every human being who, because of his age, his
physical or mental state, or his economic situation, finds
himself unable to work has the right to receive from the
collectivity a suitable means of existence. 2
The American constitution, in contrast, offers no similar guarantee.13
right, they also offer tremendous learning opportunities for the United States. Weaver, supra
note 7, at 185.
'0 See Lessons, supra note 7. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security
also devoted a hearing to considering the experiences of other countries. See The Future of
Social Security for this Generation and the Next: Experiences of Other Countries: Hearing
Before the House Ways and Means Subcomm. on Social Security, 105th Cong., I st Sess., Serial
105-41 (1997).
" In the hearing on social security reform lessons learned in other countries, the House
Ways and Means Committee heard testimony regarding reform of the retirement systems in
Australia, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See Lessons,
supra note 7,passim. The committee, however, did not hear specific testimony regarding reform
of the French retirement system.
12 Pramnbule de la constitution du 27 octobre 1946 (Author's translation). The Current
French constitution reafirms this preamble. See pr6ambule de la constitution du 4 octobre 1948.
" Ann I. Park, Comment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human
Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1195, 1196-97 (1987)
(footnotes omitted), stating:
The United States Constitution provides no right to the fulfillment of basic
human needs. Many scholars have argued that United States law should
2001]
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The French retirement system is founded on the notion of solidarity.'4 In
fact, the French Social Security Code declares that "the French social security
organization is founded on the principle of national solidarity."' 5 The French
retirement system promotes two types of solidarity: intergenerational solidarity
and intragenerational solidarity. Intergenerational solidarity arises from the
fact that contributions of current workers are used to fund benefits for current
retirees, that is, the system is funded on a pay-as-you go basis.
16
Intergenerational solidarity arises from the system's redistribution between
socio-professional categories and genders.'7
Unlike the French retirement system, the American retirement system is not
funded primarily on a pay-as-you go basis. Rather, pre-funded retirement
benefits play a much larger role in the American retirement system. As of
1996, about half of the American work force was covered by an employer-
sponsored pension plan,' 8 and employer-sponsored pension plans held over
three trillion dollars in assets.' 9 This is not to suggest, however, that
intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution play no role in the
American retirement system. The American social security system is funded
explicitly guarantee human welfare rights. American constitutional law,
however, has never recognized such rights, nor imposed any positive legal
requirement that government provide basic needs-such as subsistence
benefits, housing, medical care, or education-to its people.
14 See LA RETRAnT EN 10 QUESTION 10 REPONSES 6 (la documentation francaise 1999)
(declaring that solidarity is at the heart of the French retirement system); JEAN-MICHELCHARPN,
L'AVENIR DE NOS RETRAITES 22 (1999). See also Christine Daniel & Carole Tuchszirer,
Assurance, assistance, solidaritd: Quelsfondementspour la protection sociale?, 30 LAREVVE
DE L'IRES 5, 14 (1999) (declaring that solidarity is considered by almost all as the foundation
of all social intervention whatever the form employed to fight against worker insecurity).
"s See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 111-1 line I (Author's translation).
16 See CHARPiN 4, supra note 14, at 22. For a detailed discussion of the role of solidarity
in the French retirement system, see Daniel & Tuchszirer, supra note 14; Lucy apRoberts, la
protection sociale d 'entreprise ou la solidaritifragmentie, 30 LAREvvE DE L'IRES 93 (1993);
Bernard Friot, Assurances sociales, solidaritd naitonale, salaire socialisd, 30 LA REVVE DE
L'IRES 219 (1999).
'7 See CHARPIN, supra note 14, at 22-24. See also BONOLI, supra note 7, at 24-25
(describing how French retirement system blends contributory and non-contributory elements).
" See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., RETIREMENT INCOME: IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION REFORM 13. For purposes of this Article, the term
"pension plan" refers to both defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
19 See PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFrrS ADMIN., U.S. Dep't of Labor. Abstract of 1996
Form 5500 Annual Reports, Private Pension Plan Bulletin No. 9 Table A5 (Winter 1999-2000),
availableathttp'J/www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/programs/opr/bulletl996/table-a5.htm(Sept.
4, 2001) (this figure excludes funds held by life insurance companies under allocated group
insurance contracts for payment of retirement benefits).
(Vol. 29:441
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almost exclusively on a pay-as-you go basis 0 and provides for redistribution
within generations.'
Yet, the term "solidarity" is rarely mentioned in the context of the
American social security system.' Instead, the American social security
system is typically said to balance two competing interests: social adequacy
and individual equity.' Social adequacy means that all contributors should be
provided a certain standard of living regardless of their level of contributions,
while individual equity means that each worker should receive a benefit that
is directly related, or actuarially equivalent, to the amount of her
2 For a discussion of the funding structure of the American Social Security system, see
Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under Current Social Security System, 61 U. Prrr. L. REV.
955, 983-85 (2000) and authorities cited therein.
2 For a detailed discussion ofhow the American social security system redistributes income,
see id.
' For mention of the term "solidarity" in conjunction with the American social security
system, see Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the Treatment of Marriage: Spousal Benefits,
Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1, 61-62.
The idea that Social Security is an "earned right" because of the relationship
between taxes and benefits is a political fiction, and little if any social
solidarity would be lost by replacing it with the more sincere yet equally
compelling idea that all people, at the starting line of life, are entitled to
financial security in old age as long as they put their labor to use throughout
their working lives. This more accurately captures Social Security's original
aspiration of encouraging work while protecting workers against 'the major
hazards and vicissitudes of life.'
Dorothy E. Roberts, Sources of Commitment to Social Justice, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
175, 184-85 (1998)
Indeed, the popularity of so-called 'universal' social insurance programs has
hinged on their formal or effective exclusion of Black people. New Deal
reformers could promote Social Security as a universal program designed to
benefit all classes only by first disqualifying Black workers. 'Instead of a
,universal' welfare state that could create solidarity among workers,'
sociologist Jill Quadagno notes, 'the New Deal welfare state instituted a
regime that reinforced racial inequality.'
Robert H. Binstock, Public Polices on Aging in the Twenty-First Century, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 311,315 (1998) ("Supporters ofthe traditional payroll-tax financing mechanism of Social
Security argue that this feature of the system ensures political solidarity for it by reinforcing the
notion that it is a universal 'social insurance' program rather than a welfare program.");
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,641 (1937) (in upholding the social security program against
a constitutional challenge, the Court declared, "The purge of nation-wide calamity that began
in 1929 has taught us many lessons. Not the least is the solidarity of interests that may once
have seemed to be divided.").
2 See Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under a Partially Privatized Social Security
System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969, 969-70 (1998) and authorities cited therein.
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contributions.' Although for many years developments in the American social
security system promoted social adequacy over individual equity, 2 individual
equity, rather than social adequacy, has been the focus of much of the recent
American social security debate, particularly by proponents of partial
privatization of the system."6
Retirement income in France, as in the United States, is typically provided
by a three tier system. The three tiers in France, however, differ from those
in the United States. Specifically, in France, retirement income is usually
provided by (1) mandatory base regimes, that is, systems, (2) mandatory
complementary regimes, and (3) optional supplemental retirement plans. In
the United States, in contrast, the three tiers consist of (1) social security, (2)
2 See ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 10 (4th ed. 1993).
" See MARTHA DERTHiCK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECuRrrY 215 (1979); J. DOUGLAS
BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 25 (1977).
' For example, proponents of the Social Security Advisory Council's two partial
privatization proposals devote thirteen pages of their twenty-two-page "Comparison of Plans"
to comparing rates of return under the Advisory Council's three proposed reforms. See 11994-
1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY REPORT: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 36-
49 (1997). In contrast, they devote one sentence-and a footnote-to the issue of adequacy.
All of the plans considered by the Council have tried to insure the adequacy
of retirement income in comparison to poverty thresholds .... Since
ultimately the PSA plan provides a flat benefit for full-career workers
[equivalent to sixty-five percent of the current poverty level for an elderly
person living alone], the retirement income adequacy provided through the
central defined benefit plan is not as large as in the other plans, although the
PSA accounts are expected to more than make up for the difference.
See id. at 35 & n.2.
For an argument that social adequacy should trump individual equity in reform of the
American social security system, see Moore, supra note 2, at 164-68.
" See CouRs DES CoMPTES, supra note 2, at 5; LAMY, PROTECTION SOCIALE 1691 (2000);
LAURENCE LAUTRETTE, LE DROrr DE LA RETRAITE EN FRANCE 36-79 (1999).
Not all commentators, however, divide the French retirement system in this manner. For
example, the European Commission and some authors treat the mandatory complementary
retirement regimes as part of the first tier because these regimes are compulsory and funded on
a pay-as-you go basis. See SOPHIE MICHAS BiGUERiE, REGIMES PRIVES DE RETRAITES
COMPLMENTAIRES: PERSPECTivES COMPARATIVE ET EuROPtENE 3 (1998) (noting that some
authors and the European Commission have treated the mandatory complementary retirement
regimes as part of the first tier); Philippe Liagre, Le retraite collective d'entreprise apris la loi
du 8 aoit 1994, DR. SOC. 411,416 n.37 (1995). See also FRANCIS KESSLER, DROIT DE LA
PROTECTION SOCIALE 378 (2000) (noting that mandatory complementary retirement regimes
could be considered as second stage of first tier). On the other hand, some commentators treat
both the mandatory complementary retirement regimes and voluntary supplemental retirement
plans as part of the second tier. See, e.g., REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 28. For purposes of this
Article, the way in which the system is divided is less important than recognizing each of the
elements of the system.
[Vol. 29:441
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optional employer-sponsored pensions, and (3) individual savings.2" Of
course, retirement income in France may be supplemented by individual
savings, and individual savings are sometimes referred to as the "fourth" tier
of the French retirement system. 29 This section will give a general overview
of each of the first three tiers of the French retirement system.
30
A. First Tier
The first tier of the French retirement system consists of mandatory base
regimes. There are more than 120 different mandatory base regimes in France
today,3' although only about 26 of these regimes are open to new participants.32
The mandatory base regimes are typically divided into four different
categories: (1) the general regime,3 (2) the special regimes,' (3) the
agricultural regime, and (4) the regimes for non-agricultural, non-wage
earners.35 Of these four categories, the general regime is by far the most
" See Christoper Bone, An Actuarial Perspective on How Social Security Reform Could
Influence Employer-Sponsored Pensions, in PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 333, at
333 (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1999) (describing U.S. retirement income system as three-
legged stool). Commentators also sometimes point to a fourth source of retirement income for
the elderly; the federal safety-net program called Supplemental Security Income. See Moore,
supra note 1, at 165 & n.202 (1998) and authorities cited therein.
29 Philippe Laigre & Pierre Mascomere, La Retraite Supplementaire, Liaisons Sociales
Supplement au No. 12044 du Novembre 1995, at 10.
30 For a brief overview of individual initiatives, see LAMY, supra note 27, at 1693-94;
Cinquante ans de S6curit6 sociale continuit6 et mutations a l'aube du XXIeme si6cle: Groupe
no. 1: Les fonds de pension 26 (1996) [hereinafter Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1].
"' See Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at 111-12 ("there are about 120 first-pillar retirement
schemes other than the general regime"); GILLES HUTEAU & ERIC LE BONT, StCURIT SOCIALE
ET POLITIQUES SOCIALES 15 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that there are almost 150 first-tier regimes).
32 See L 'avenir des systemes de retraite, Avis du Conseil economique et social presentipar
M Rene Teulade, rapporteur au nom de la section des Affaires sociales, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN(AISE [J.O.], Avis et Rapports du Conseil Economique et Social 4 (Jan.
II & 12, 2000) (noting that about 100 base regimes are in the course of extinction because they
do not accept new participants while 26 base regimes do accept new participants).
33 The French general regime encompases health insurance, coverage for work injuries, and
family benefits as well as retirement benefits for wage earners from the private sector. See
COURS DES COMPTES, supra note 2, at 7 (describing the organization of the general regime).
This Article will focus solely on the retirement benefits provided through the general regime,
and, in particular, on "l'assurance vieillesse," or old-age benefits.
' The special regimes are public regimes much like the United States' Railroad Retirement
System or state or local government systems for state and local government employees who are
not covered by the American Social Security System.
s See, e.g., COURs DES COMPrEs (dividing the social security regimes into four groups
described in text); BONOLI, supra note 7, at 127 (same); HUTEAU & LE BONT, supra note 31, at
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important in terms of coverage. As of 1996, about 65% of workers were
affiliated with the general regime,36 while 3% of workers were affiliated with
the agricultural regime,3" 20% of workers were affiliated with one of the more
than 120 special regimes, 38 and the remaining 12% of workers were affiliated
with one of the six non-agricultural, non-wage earner regimes. 39 Because the
general regime is so important in terms of coverage, this section will focus
principally on the general regime. This is not to suggest, however, that the
other first tier regimes are not important. Indeed, the very existence of this
multiplicity of first tier regimes makes the French retirement system extremely
complex' and difficult to reform."
15-16 (same); LAUTRETTE, supra note 27, at 36-41 (same).
" The general regime covers the vast majority of wage earners from the private sector. See
Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at I 11; LAUTRETTE, supra note 27, at 36; REYNAUD, supra note
7, at 18. In 1996, there were about 14 million workers contributing to the regime and 9.2
million retirees receiving benefits from the regime. See L'avenir des systemes de retraite, supra
note 32, at 10, tbl. 1.
" The agricultural regime covers wage earners employed in the agricultural sector. See
REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 18. In 1996, there were about 650,000 workers contributing to the
regime and 2.17 million retirees receiving benefits from the regime. See L 'avenir des systimes
de retraite, supra note 32, at 10, tbl. 1.
" The special regimes cover state employees, workers in the public sector, and a few
categories of private sector wage earners, such as miners. See LAUTRETTE, supra note 27, at 38;
REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 18. In 1996, there were about 4.7 million workers contributing to
the special regimes and 3.5 million retirees receiving benefits from the regimes. See L 'avenir
des systemes de retraite, supra note 32, at 10, tbl. 1. Although there are more than 120 different
special regimes, only 15 accept new participants. See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 791 & n.4;
LIVRE BLANC SUR LES RETRAITES: GUARANTIR DANS L'EQUITE LES RETRAITES DE DEMAIN 40
(1991); REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 13. The importance of the individual special regimes varies
from regimes that cover few beneficiaries, such as the regime for the Comic Opera or the Bank
of France, to regimes of much larger import, such as the regimes for the SNCF (the French
railway system) or mines. Id. See also REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 13 & Tbls. 2 & 3 (identifying
the most important special regimes, the number of workers affiliated with those regimes and the
number of pensions paid by those regimes).
"9 The non-agricultural, non-wage earner regimes cover workers outside of the other three
categories, including professionals, such as lawyers, independent merchants and business
owners, and craftsmen. See LAUTRETTE, supra note 27, at 39; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 19.
In 1996, there were about 2.3 million workers contributing to these regimes and 3.8 million
retirees receiving benefits from the regimes. See L'avenir des systemes de retraite, supra note
32, at 10, tbl. 1. (These figures include the regime for "exploitants agricoles.").
'o See Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at 111.
" See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 305. Moreover, this multiplicity of regimes is viewed
as one of the failures of the French retirement system. When the general regime was originally
enacted in 1945, the founders anticipated that the general regime would ultimately extend to the
entire population. Efforts to extend the general regime to the entire active population, however,
met with fierce opposition and uniformity has never been achieved. See id. at 276 & n. 1;
[Vol. 29:441
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1. General Regime
The French general regime was created in 1945,42 ten years after the
American social security system was enacted.4' Like the American social
security system," the French general regime is funded principally4 s on a pay-
as-you go basis; that is, current contributions to the system are used to fund
current benefits." Participating workers are required to contribute 6.55% of
earnings" up to a ceiling48 that is indexed to changes in average annual
wages,49 and participating employers are required to contribute 8.2% of
earnings up to the ceiling plus an additional 1.6% of all earnings, both above
and below the ceiling."0
The general regime pays retirees a fixed amount per month for life based
on a benefit formula,5" which may be described as P = S.A.M. x t x d/D, where
P = pension, S.A.M. = average annual salary, t = rate, d = duration of
participation in general regime, and D = maximum duration of participation
HUTEAU & LE BoNT, supra note 31, at 12; Blanchet & P0I6, supra note 2, at I11.
42 See Ord. 4 oct. 1945. The ordinance enacting the French social security system in 1945
did not use the term "general regime," although that term is now used to refer to the system
established by the 1945 ordinance. See DuPEYROUX, supra 2, at 274.
4 See 11 Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
" For a discussion of the funding structure of the American social security system, see
Moore, supra note 20, at 983-85 (2000) and authorities cited therein.
4s In 1993, the general regime was amended to provide for new sources of funds, the "fonds
de solidarit6 vieillesse," for benefits which are not attributable to contributions. For a detailed
discussion of this amendment, see infra p. 474. In addition, the 1999 social security financing
law created a special reserve to help finance the anticipated increase in benefits beginning in
2005. For a discussion of this provision, see infra p. 474.
" See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 701; CHAUCHARD, supra note 2, at 307.
47 Earnings are defined very broadly. See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 242-1; DUPEYROUX, supra
note 2, at 726-42.
"See BONOLI, supra note 7, at 127 n.6 (noting that generally the ceiling is about 120% of
inflation); TONY LYNES, PAYING FOR PENsIONS: THE FRENCH ExPERIENCE 24, 54-56 (1985)
(discussing various levels at which general regime ceiling adjusted between 1947 and 1980s).
See also infra p. 459 (discussing fact that in recent years general regime ceiling has risen much
more rapidly than average wages).
4' See Soc. Sec. Code art. D. 242-3; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 717. In 2000, the ceiling
was equal to 44,100 francs for earnings calculated on a quarterly basis. See Decr. No. 99-1029
(Dec. 9, 1999), reprinted in Soc. Sec. Code (2001), at 2038-39. (On December 22, 2000, US
$1 was worth 7.10 French francs. See Liberation 24 (Dec. 23 & 24, 2000)). For a discussion
of how the ceiling is set each year, see DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 744.
so See Soc. Sec. Code art. D. 242-4; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 717.
"' The American social security system also pays benefits in the form of a life annuity. For
a discussion of the benefit structure of the American social security system, see Moore, supra
note 20, at 985-90 and authorities cited therein.
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taken into account (150 quarters).52 The following describes each of the
elements of the benefit formula in more detail.
a. Average Annual Salary
The first element of the formula, S.A.M. or "salaire annuel moyen," refers
to the retiree's average annual salary. For retirees reaching age 60 before
January 1, 1994, the average annual salary is based on the retiree's highest 10
years of earnings. The number of years of salary taken into account is
scheduled to gradually increase to the retiree's highest 25 years of earnings for
retirees who reach age 60 on or after January 1, 2008."3 Just as the salary on
which worker contributions are based is capped," the salary which may be
taken into account in calculating the average annual salary for purposes of
benefit calculation is also capped.55
b. Rate
The second element of the formula, "t" or "taux," is the rate. The rate is
capped at fifty percent and is generally a function of the age at which the
retiree begins to collect benefits and the amount of time the retiree (or a third
party on behalf of the retiree)' contributed (or is treated as having
contributed)"7 to any base regime. Retirees reaching age 60 prior to January
52 See DUPEYROUx, supra note 2, at 472.
s See Soc. Sec. Code arts. R. 351-29, 351-29-1; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 476 & n.3.;
Decret No. 93-1022 du 27 aoft 1993 relatif au calcul des pension de retraite, Title H, .O. DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE 12145,12146 (Aug. 28,1993). Beginning in 1994, the average period
was increased by one year for participants born in 1934 and is scheduled to increase by one year
each year until it reaches 25 years in 2008 for participants born on or after 1948. Soc. Sec. Code
art. R. 351-29-1. See also infra p. 477.
4 See infra p. 480.
" See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 476 n.2. See also REYNAuD, supra note 7, at 15 (noting
that salary taken into account in calculating benefits is the capped salary that serves as the base
for contributions).
s6 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 473 n.3.
s Individuals are treated as having contributed to a base regime during involuntary
interruptions of work giving rise to maternity, workers' compensation or unemployment
benefits, certain periods of unemployment not giving rise to unemployment benefits, periods of
national service if the individual was a participant in a base regime before the national service,
periods of educational break for parents, and single women who have raised children are given
two quarters credit for each child. See Soc. Sec. Code §§ L. 351-3, 351-4 and R. 351-14;
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 473 n.3. In addition, individuals may be treated as having
contributed to a base regime during certain periods of professional activity prior to April 1,
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1, 1994, are entitled to begin collecting benefits at age 60 at the maximum rate
of 50 percent if they have 150 quarters or 37.5 years of participation in a base
regime by age 60. For retirees reaching age 60 on or after January 1, 1994, the
number of quarters required for benefits at the maximum rate beginning at age
60 is scheduled to increase gradually to 160 quarters or 40 years by 2008.8
Certain categories of retirees are entitled to the full rate of fifty percent
regardless of the amount of time they contributed (or are treated as having
contributed) to a base regime. Specifically, retirees who begin to collect
benefits at or after age 65,"9 qualified disabled workers,' certain deported or
interned members of the Resistance,6 and veterans and prisoners of war62 are
entitled to the full rate regardless of the length of their participation in a base
regime. In addition, women workers who have raised three or more children
and have worked in manual labor for at least five years are eligible for the full
rate once they have contributed or are treated as having contributed to the
general regime, agricultural regime, or both for 30 years.63
For individuals who elect to retire before they are eligible for the full rate,
the rate is decreased by 1.25% for each missing quarter. The missing quarters
are based on the lesser of the number of quarters required until the retiree
reaches age 65 or the number of quarters required for the full rate at age 60.'
Thus, for example, suppose that an individual born in March 1940 wishes to
retire at age 61 on April 1, 2001. As of April 1, 2001, the individual will have
150 quarters of participation in the general regime while the law requires that
an individual born that year have 157 quarters of coverage for the full rate at
age 60. Because the individual wishes to retire 4 years, or 16 quarters, before
age 65, the reduction based on age is 1.25% x 16, or 20%. Because the
1983. See id. at 473 n.3.
SS See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 473; Decret No. 93-1022 du 27 aoflt 1993 relatif au
calcul des pension de retraite, Title II, J.O. 12145, 12145-46 (Aug. 28, 1993). Beginning in
1994, the period of participation was increased by one quarter for individuals born in 1934 and
is scheduled to increase by one quarter each year until it reaches 160 in 2003 for retirees born
in 1943 or after. See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 473 n.4. See also infra p. 477.
See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 35 1-8 line I; DUPEYROux, supra note 2, at 475.
"o To qualify as disabled, workers must be unable to work without grave injury to their
health. See Soc. Sec. Code art. Sees. L. 351-7,351-8 line 2, R. 351-21; DUPEYROUX, supra note
2, at 473-74. For a description of the disability benefits that apply to qualified disabled workers
prior to age 60, see id. at 459-64. See also Soc. Sec. Code arts. L. 341-1-342-6, R. 341-1-342-6,
D. 341-1-342-1.
"See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 351-8 line 3; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 474.
" See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 351-8 line 5, DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 474.
o See Soc. Sec. Code arts. L. 351-8 line 4, R. 351-23, 351-24; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2,
at 474.
" See DuPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 474.
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individual has 7 quarters of participation less than is required for the full rate
at age 60 (157-150), the reduction based on quarters of participation required
for the full rate is 1.25% x 7, or 8.75%. Because the reduction based on
quarters required for the full rate (8.75%) is less than that based on quarters
until age 65 (20%), the individual's rate will be reduced by the former and thus
equal 50% - 8.75% or 41.25%.
c. Participation Ratio
The final element of the formula (d/D) is the ratio of the duration of
participation in the general regime (capped at 150 quarters) 65 to the maximum
number of quarters of participation taken into account (150)." Thus, suppose
that as of 2001, a retiree born in 1941 has 158 quarters of participation: 120
quarters in the general regime and 38 quarters in the agricultural regime.67 The
retiree's general regime benefit will equal S.A.M. x t x 120/150." Individuals
who retire after age 65 with less than 150 quarters of participation in the
general regime are credited with an additional 2.5% of participation per
quarter, or 10% per year for employment beyond age 65, until the maximum
participation of 150 quarters is reached."
In order to qualify for a quarter of coverage, a participant must earn at least 200 x the
S.M.I.C. (minimum wage) during the year. A participant's entire annual salary will be taken
into account, regardless of when earned, in calculating the quarters of participation, but a
participant can be credited with no more than 4 quarters in any given year. Thus, an occasional
worker who earns a total of 200 x the S.M.I.C. over a 10 month period will be credited with one
quarter of coverage, while a highly paid short-term worker who earns 4 x 200 x the S.M.I.C. in
the first two months of the year will be credited with four quarters of coverage even if she does
not work throughout the rest of the year. See Soc. Sec. Code art. R. 351-9; DUPEYROUX, supra
note 2, at 475.
" See Soc. Sec. Code art R. 351-6; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 475. Even though the
number of quarters of participation required for the full rate at age 60 is gradually increasing to
160, the maximum number of quarters taken into account in calculating the ratio remains 150.
See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 475 n. 1.
67 As of 1988, the average retiree received benefits from 1.5 different base regimes. See
LIVRE BLANC SUR LES RETRAITES, supra note 38, at 55.
" Cf DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 475 n.2. Because benefits under the agricultural regime
are calculated in an almost identical manner, the retiree's agricultural regime benefits will equal
S.A.M. x t x 38/150. See id.
69 See Soc. Sec. Code art. R. 351-7; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 475-76.
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d. Adjustments
General regime benefits are subject to a number of additional adjustments.
For example, benefits are adjusted each year in conjunction with changes in
wages or prices,7" and benefits may be reduced (or eliminated) if the retiree
continues to work beyond the age of 60.7' In addition, benefits may be
increased for retirees who have three or more children,72 for retirees with a
dependent spouse under certain, limited circumstances, 73 and for disabled
retirees who rely on a third person for assistance with daily living activities.!4
Finally, dependent surviving spouses or former spouses75 may receive a
survivors benefit equal to the greater of a threshold amount76 or 54%77 of their
70 Between 1987 and 1999, pensions were adjusted based on changes in prices. Tradition-
ally, however, pensions were adjusted on the basis of changes in wages. See Soc. Sec. Code art.
R. 351-29-2; L 'avenir des systhmes de retraite, supra note 32, at 7, 9; DUPEYRoUX, supra note
2, at 477-78; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 15; Rolande Reullan, Retrartes: l'impossible reforme
est-elle achev6e?, DR. Soc. 911, at 919-20. (Dec. 1993). See also infra p. 474.
7' In order to be eligible for reduced benefits, workers must be at least 60 years of age, have
at least 150 quarters of coverage, and work part-time in a position that is covered by the general
regime or agricultural regime. The amount of reduction varies between 30% and 70%,
depending on how much the retiree works. See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 351-15, 315-16;
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 479.
' Benefits for these workers are increased by ten percent. See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 351-
12, R. 351-30; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 476-77. This uniquely French provision is related
to France's longstanding pro-natal policy. See Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Cinquante ans
de S6curit6 sociale continuite et mutations a l'aube du XXIerne sicle: Groupe no. 3: Le syst~xe
de retraite et les droits des femmes 4 (Apr. 1996) [hereinafter, Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 3].
For an overview of France's unique family benefits and pro-natal policy, see, for example,
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 40-41, 49.
7 Specifically, the increased benefit is only available if the spouse is 65 or older (or between
60 and 65 in the case of disability), is not otherwise eligible for an old age or disability benefit,
and has resources below a particular threshold. See Soc. Sec. Code arts. L. 351-13, R. 351-31;
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 477. As the number of women working and earning their own
pensions has increased, the importance of this provision has decreased. Thus, while about one
in five households benefitted from the provision in 1960, less than 3 percent of the general
regime retirees benefitted from the provision by 1996. See Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 3, supra
note 72, at 3-4.
' See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 355-1; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 477.
7' In order to receive the benefit, the former dependent spouse must not have remarried. If
the former insured spouse has not remarried, then the benefit is divided between the insured
spouse's current and former spouses based on the respective duration of each marriage. See Soc.
Sec. Code art. L. 353-3; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 486-88.
76 The minimum benefit was equal to 17,633 francs per year in 2000. See Decr. no. 99-1146
du 29 dec. 1999, art. 1, cited in Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 353-1.
77 See Soc. Sec. Code art. D. 353-1.
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working spouse's benefit upon the death'h of the insured spouse,' and very
low wage earners may receive a minimum benefit.'
2. Other Base Regimes
Three of the other base regimes1 are "aligned" with the general regime so
that they have almost identical contribution and benefit provisions." The
special regimes and the other base regimes that are not aligned with the
general regime have very different provisions. For example, most of the
special regimes83 accrue benefits at the rate of 2% per year, up to a maximum
of 75%," and base benefits on final pay.85 One of the non-wage, non-
agricultural regimes, in contrast, calculates benefits as a percentage of a
minimum level of benefits." Overall, the special regimes typically pay much
higher benefits than does the general regime, 7 while the other base regimes
that are not aligned with the general regime typically pay much lower benefits
than does the general regime.8
In November 1995, then-Prime Minister Alain Jupp6 announced the need
to reform the special regimes to alleviate the financial pressures they faced as
' The survivors benefit is also available if the insured spouse disappears for more than a
year. See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 353-2; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 484.
" See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 353-1.
sW The minimum benefit was 38,949 francs per year in 1998 and is designed to ensure that
workers who contribute to the general regime receive a benefit that, when added to the
complementary retirement benefit, is larger than the "minimum vieillesse" benefit which is
available to all individuals over the age of 65 regardless of whether they ever contributed to any
retirement plan. See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 476 & 1131-35.
" The three base regimes aligned with the general regime are the base regime for salaried
agricultural workers managed by the social agricultural mutual insurance, the base regime for
industrialists and merchants managed by the ORGANIC funds, and the base regime for
craftsmen managed by the CANCAVA funds. See id. at 471.
" See id. There are some minor differences. For example, the extension from 10 to 25 of
the number of years of salary that are taken into account in calculating the average annual salary
is more gradual for the non-wage, non-agricultural regimes than for the general regime. See id.
at 476 n.3.
The special regimes for miners and sailors are an exception. See id. at 795.
8 See id. at 795-96.
For all workers, other than notary clerks and Opera artists, the base is at least the last six
months of earnings. See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 796.
" See REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 16.
17 See BONOLI, supra note 7, at 129; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 14.
s See REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 16 (giving brief overview of way in which benefits
calculated and explaining that for the most part these regimes pay much lower benefits than do
the general regime).
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a result of the aging of the population and to provide for greater uniformity
between all of the base regimes.8 He created a commission to propose
specific measures to implement this reform,"0 but the proposed reform met
with such fierce public opposition-the most significant strikes since
1968-that the commission was dissolved less than two weeks after it was
installed, and the proposed reform was abandoned." Calls to reform the
special regimes to create greater uniformity between all of the base regimes
have been renewed,"2 but no major overhaul of the special regimes has yet
been enacted.
B. Second Tier
The second tier of the French retirement system consists of mandatory
complementary retirement regimes. French law' 3 requires that workers who
are covered by the general regime or the agricultural regime also be covered
by one or more mandatory complementary retirement regimes.' In addition,
'9 See BONOLI, supra note 7, at 141 ("Financial problems coupled with the more favourable
conditions enjoyed by members of this scheme, were the key reasons put forward in order to
justify a reform of the rail workers scheme, as well as of other public sector schemes."); Francis
Kessler, Quel avenir pour le regime des retraitesfonctionnaires de !'Etat?: Une contribution
au debat sur la reforme des regimes speciaux, 34 REvUE DE DROIT SANITAIRE ET SOCIAL 423,
at 423 (1998). Specifically, Jupp6 declared that the period of participation required for benefits
at the full rate would have to be extended from 37 V to 40 years, as is in the general regime, and
that a "caisse de retraite des agents de ]a fonction publique de l'Etat" would have to be created
like the "caisse nationale de retraite des agents des collectivites locales." See id.
" See Kessler, supra note 89, at 423.
'1 See id. See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 315, 318, 813; HUTEAU & LE BONT, supra
note 31, at 25; Tactical Retreat, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 1995, at 45. The reform of the special
regimes was part of a much more comprehensive reform of the entire French social security
system. Reform of pensions provided by the special regimes was abandoned but the remainder
of the comprehensive reform was pursued. See BONoU, supra note 7, at 146.
92 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Speer, France Announces Pension Reform; Fails to Consider
Capitalization Funds, 27 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 830 (Mar. 28, 2000) (noting that Prime
Minister Lionel Jospin proposed to "require France's 5 million public sector employees to work
a minimum of 40 years to receive a full pension. At present civil servants work 37.5 years for
a full pension, while France's 14.5 million private sector employees are required to put in 40
years work for the same retirement benefits."); Alain Vasselle, Senateur, Rapport d'Information
fait au nom de la commission des Affaires sociales sur la reforme des retraites 45-46 (contending
that it is essential that the special regimes begin reforms to equalize their treatment with the less
generous general and aligned regimes). For a critique of certain proposals to reform the special
regimes, see Kessler, supra note 89.
93 See Loi du 29 d6cembre 1972; Soc. Sec. Code art L. 921-1.
94 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 970. See also KESSLER, supra note 27, at 204-05,373-
74 (explaining that participation in mandatory complementary retirement regimes is required
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most individuals affiliated with a non-agricultural, non-wage earner regime
must also be covered by a mandatory complementary retirement regime.95
Because the special regimes typically provide much higher levels of benefits
than do the other base regimes,' most workers97 covered by a special regime
need not be covered by a mandatory complementary retirement regime.98
With a few limited exceptions," the mandatory complementary retirement
regimes covering workers affiliated with the general regime and the agricul-
tural regime are federated by one of two organizations: (1) the Association des
regimes de retraite complementaire (ARRCO), and (2) the Association
generale des institutions de retraites des cadres (AGIRC). ° This section will
discuss these two mandatory complementary retirement regimes'' because
they are the most important in terms of coverage.
02
because of the relatively limited level of benefits provided by the general regime). But see
Laurent Caussat, Les accords du 25 avril 1996 relatifs aux regimes interprofessionels de retraite
complementaire: un exercice d 'alerte avantl 'arrivie du cyclone?, DR. Soc. 729, 729 n.3 (1996)
(noting that there may be legislative exceptions to this requirement and enumerating one such
exception: workers under employment solidarity contract).
9See REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 17-19, 35-36 (giving overview of the coverage for specific
groups of non-agricultural, non-wage earners and describing population covered by a mandatory
complementary retirement regime).
9 See supra p. 456. See also Ruellan, supra note 70, at 916.
' Miners are an exception to the rule; they are also covered by ARRCO and AGIRC. See
REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 14.
" See id. (noting that retirement benefits provided by the special regimes are typically much
higher than the retirement benefits provided by the other first tier regimes and thus most workers
covered by a special regime are not covered by a mandatory complementary retirement regime).
" For an enumeration of the few limited exceptions, see DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 970
n.4, 987 n.6; Caussat, supra note 94, at 729 n.3; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 17.
' Both organizations were founded by voluntary national collective accords and became
mandatory in 1972. See REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 17-18; Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at
111. For a brief history of the organizations, see DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 981-82,986-87;
REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 29-31.
101 For a discussion of the other mandatory complementary retirement regimes, see
REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 46-53. See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 824 (giving brief
overview of mandatory complementary retirement regimes for non-agricultural, non-wage
earners).
'0o See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 973 & n.4, 986,988 (describing ARRCO, AGIRC, and
IRCANTEC, which covers certain public sector workers, as the principal mandatory
complementary retirement regimes and showing that in 1995 ARRCO had 15 million active
participants and 9 million beneficiaries, AGIRC had 2.8 million active participants and 1.5
million beneficiaries, and IRCANTEC had 1.9 million active participants and 1.27 million
beneficiaries).
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1. Overview of ARRCO and AGIRC
Like the general regime, ARRCO and AGIRC are funded principally on a
pay-as-you-go basis. 3 Unlike the general regime and most pay-as-you-go
systems, however, ARRCO and AGRIC are defined contribution, rather than
defined benefit, systems.'" In principle, the contribution rates are fixed in
advance, while benefits are not fixed in advance but instead depend on the
contributions levied. Thus, if the scheme's financial situation worsens,
pensions will automatically be reduced, unless the social partners elect to
increase contributions. There is no advance commitment or contractual
obligation to increase contributions to provide retirees a defined level of
benefits.'" In practice, however, ARRCO and AGIRC have increased the
level of contributions over the years and have not required retirees to bear the
entire burden of a worsening financial situation.'"
2. ARRCO
ARRCO covers all workers in the private sector, that is, both managers and
non-managers.'0 7 It does not, however, cover all of the wages'" of all workers.
Rather, it only covers the wages of managers up to the general regime
ceiling' and the wages of non-managers up to three times the general regime
ceiling. "' For purposes of ARRCO, wages up to the general regime ceiling are
typically referred to as level A wages while wages between the general regime
103 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 975, 982; Emmanuel Reynaud, Financing retirement
pensions: Pay-as-you-go and Funded Systems in the European Union, 48 INT'L SOC. SECURITY
REV. 41, 47-48 (1995); LAUTRETTE, supra note 27, at 52. But see KESSLER, supra note 27, at
382 n.2 (noting that ARRCO has reserves equal to about one year's worth of benefits).
ZoO See Reynaud, supra note 103, at 47-48.
' See id.; LYNES, supra note 48, at 42.
106 See also Reynaud, supra note 103, at 48 ("This reduction has been organized in such a
way as to share the cost of balancing the scheme between contributors and pensioners.").
" Originally, ARRCO only covered non-managers. See DUPEYRoux, supra note 2, at 972.
It was extended to cover executives in 1973. See id. at 985.
,o Since January 1, 1996, wages have been defined in the same manner as earnings for
purposes of the general regime. See Avenant 48, art. 12. See also Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 242-1;
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 983.
"09 See Avenant 48 art. 13. See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 985; Caussat, supra note
94, at 729; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 39.
"o See Avenant 48 art. 13. See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 983; REYNAUD, supra note
7, at 39. Very few non-managers, however, earn more than the general regime ceiling. See
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 984 n. 1; Caussat, supra note 94, at 730 & n.5.
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ceiling and three times that ceiling are typically referred to as level B wages."
Contributions to ARRCO are usually divided so that the employer pays 60%
of the contribution while the employee pays 40% of the contribution." 2
a. AARCO's Funding Provisions
Traditionally, ARRCO was funded by both mandatory contributions and
voluntary contributions. Accords signed in 1993 and 1996 phased in increases
in the mandatory contribution rates and phased out voluntary contributions.
This section will begin by discussing mandatory contributions. It will then
address voluntary contributions.
Prior to 1993, the rate for mandatory contributions was set at 4%."'
Effective January 2, 1993, the rate was gradually increased to 6% beginning
in 1999.1 4 Traditionally, this rate applied to non-managers' wages"' up to 3
times the general regime ceiling," 6 and managers' wages up to the general
regime ceiling. Pursuant to an accord signed April 25, 1996, the rate on wages
up to the general regime ceiling (level A wages) will remain 6% while the rate
applied to non-managers' wages above the general regime ceiling to 3 times
that ceiling (level B wages)"7 will gradually increase to 16% by 2005.8
.. See, e.g., DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 983.
112 Prior to an April, 25, 1996 accord, pursuant to collective bargaining agreements,
employers typically paid 60% of the ARRCO contribution while employees paid 40% although
ARRCO did not mandate any particular division of contributions. See DUPEYRoUX, supra note
2, at 983. An April 25, 1996 accord made the 60/40 division mandatory, unless a prior accord
or convention provided for a different division. See Avenant 48 du 18 Juin 1998 A l'Accord du
8 d6cembre 1961 art. 15 [hereinafter Avenant 48]. See also KESSLER, supra note 27, at 391;
Caussat, supra note 94, at 732.
11 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 983; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 35-36.
14 See Avenant 48, art. 13. See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 983; REYNAUD, supra
note 7, at 35-36.
"' Since January 1, 1996, earnings are defined by Section L. 242-1 of the social security
code. See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 983. Prior to that date, they were based on earnings for
purposes of income tax. Id.
'16 See id. at 983.
.. Although the increase in mandatory rate is significant, its application is relatively limited
because very few non-managers earn wages above the general regime ceiling. See Caussat,
supra note 94, at 730 n.5.
i1s See Avenant 48, art 13(b). See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 986. Specifically, the
rate is 10% beginning in 2000, 12% beginning in 2002, 14% beginning in 2004, and 16%
beginning in 2005. See Avenant 48, art. 13(b); KESSLER, supra note 27, at 391 n.1. For
employers that became affiliated with ARRCO after 1996, the 16% rate applies beginning in
2000. See Avenant 48, art. 13(b). See also KESSLER, supra note 27, at 391 n. 1; DUPEYROUX,
supra note 2, at 986.
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The mandatory rate is adjusted by a "taux d'appel" or "calling rate"' 9 that
is designed to stabilize benefit levels.2* In the early years, the calling rate was
less than 100%121 while it has been 125% since 1992.'2 Thus, actual
mandatory contributions on wages up to the general regime ceiling are now
equal to 6% x 125%, or 7.5%.' Points for benefits purposes, however, are
based on the "contractual" mandatory rate of 6%.)
Prior to accords signed in 1993 and 1996, ARRCO permitted voluntary
contributions but limited them such that total contributions (that is, voluntary
and mandatory "contractual" contributions) could not exceed 8% of level A
wages and 16% of non-managers' level B wages.' 5 A December 10, 1993,
accord limited voluntary contributions so that total contributions (that is,
voluntary and mandatory "contractual" contributions) can not exceed 6% of
level A wages and 16% of non-manager' level B wages."2 Thus, since 1999
(when the mandatory regular rate reached 6%), no voluntary contributions
have been permitted on level A wages. 27  Beginning in 2005, when the
mandatory contractual rate on non-managers' level B wages reaches 16%, no
voluntary contributions on level B wages will be possible." s Like mandatory
contributions, voluntary contributions are subject to the calling rate.' 9
"9 See Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at 116 tbl. 3.4, n.a.
120 See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 391; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 974.
321 See Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at 116 tbl. 3.4 n.a.
", See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 983.
'2' Cf Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at 116 tbl. 3.4 n.a (referring to the unadjusted
mandatory rate as the "basic statutory contribution rate").
,24 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 974.
'2 See id. at 983.
'2 See Avenant 48, art. 13(l)(b). See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 983.
I27 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 984. There is an exception, however, for obligations
created prior to January 2, 1993. See Accord du 10 F6vrier 1993 pris pour l'application de
certaines dispositions de 1'accord du 8 d6cembre 1961 codifi, art. 3 (noting that enterprises or
professional sectors can continue to contribute at a higher rate or decrease their rate to 6% in the
case of obligations created prior to January 2, 1993).
'n See Avenant 48, art. 13(l)(b); DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 984.
'29 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 983 n.3.
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b. ARRCO's Benefit Provisions
ARRCO benefits are calculated using a points system. 3' Each year the cost
of a point, or the "reference wage," is set,' and workers acquire a number of
points that is directly proportional to their contributions (and the contributions
that their employers make on their behalf 32) for the year.133  Thus, for
example, suppose that during a particular year the "reference wage," or cost
of a point, is 60 francs, and a worker (and employer on her behalf) contributes
a total of 3000 francs that year.' The worker will acquire 50 points (3 000/60)
that year. Workers may also accrue credit for past services 13' and for periods
of inactivity such as certain periods of unemployment
136 and disability.137
A worker's pension is then equal to the total number of points accrued over
her career multiplied by the value of a point, which is fixed each year.' 3' Thus,
for example, suppose that a worker accrued 1000 points over her career. Each
year she will receive 1000 x the value of a point that year. Thus, during a year
in which a point is worth 2.5 francs, she will receive 2500 francs.'39
30 See id. at 984; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 40. But see DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 984
(noting that a few regimes base benefits on a percentage of salary); LYNES, supra note 48, at 68
(same).
"' Prior to January 1, 1999, ARRCO consisted of more than 40 different regimes. Compare
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 980 (stating that there were 45 different ARRCO regimes before
January 1, 1999) with KESSLER, supra note 27, at 384 (referring to 43 different ARRCO regimes
before January 1, 1999). Thus, prior to January 1, 1999, each separate ARRCO regime applied
its own set of rules to determine the price and value of ARRCO points. See id. at 384,390 n.2.
See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 980; Caussat, supra note 94, at 732; LYNES, at 68.
Effective January 1, 1999, when ARRCO became a single regime, there is only one price and
value for ARRCO points. See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 385.
32 As discussed above, contributions for purposes of accruing points are based on
"contractual" mandatory contributions and voluntary contributions. Actual contributions due
to the calling rate are not taken into account. Thus, a point may actually cost more than the
reference wage.
131 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 984; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 40.
'34 On December 22, 2000, $1 U.S. was worth 7.10 french francs. See LE LIBERATION 24
(Dec. 23 & 24,2000).
13S See Avenant 48, Annexe A., art. 21(2).
136 See id. at art. 23 & 24.
137 See id., at art. 22. For a complete discussion of the periods during which points may be
accrued, see LAMY, PRoTECTION SOCIALE, supra note 27, at 1484-92.
3 See Avenant 48, Annexe A, art. 1(2). See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 984;
REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 40.
139 As of 1996, the average ARRCO pension was 1,169 francs. See Cinquante ans de
S6curit6 sociale continuit6 et mutations a l'aube du XX=eme si~cle: Groupe no. 2: Les regimes
de retraite compl~mentaire: bilan d'un fonctionnement original et perspectives 13 (1996)
[hereinafter Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 2].
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In theory, the reference wage, once set, is a statistical constant that
increases with increases in the average wage while the value of a point
depends on the amount of money contributed to the regime and the number of
retirees collecting benefits that year.'" In fact, however, the social partners
have the power to use different rules to set the reference wage and value of
points and have done so.'4 For example, for a number of years, the reference
wage was indexed to increases in the average wage while the value of points
was indexed to increases in prices."" For the years 1996 through 2000, the
reference wage was indexed to the growth in the average annual wage plus 3.5
percent 43 while the value of points was indexed to increases in average wages
minus 1 percent for the years 1999 and 2000.'"
As of April 1, 2001, the cost of an ARRCO point was 76.7965 francs, or
11.7076 Euros, while the value of such a point was 6.7983 francs, or 1.0364
Euros.'45 Workers who have raised three or more children are entitled to a 5%
increase in their benefits each year.'46 In addition, retirees with dependent
children are entitled to a 5% increase in their benefits for each child for as long
as the child remains a dependent.
47
In theory, the normal retirement age is 65, and benefits are decreased for
individuals who begin to collect retirement benefits before age 65.'48 In fact,
however, individuals who fulfill the requirements for retirement at the full rate
in the general regime prior to age 65 may also receive full benefits from
ARRCO at that time.
149
,, See E-Mail Correspondence from Arnaud d'Yvoire. See also DuPEYROUX, supra note 2,
at 977.
"' See Correspondence, supra note 140; REYNAUD, supra note 103, at 48.
142 See PIERRE KHALFA ET AL., LES RETRAITES AU PERIL DU LIBERALISME (2000).
"4 See Accord du 25 Avril 1996 Relatif aux Regimes de Retraite Complementaire des
Salaries ARRCO, arts. 17 & 18.
'" See id. at art. 19.
145 See Valeur Annvelle Du Point ARRCO (visited Sept. 17, 2001) <http://www.arrco.fr/
Vpoints/vp2001.htm>.
'4 See Avenant 48, Annexe A, art. 17(2). See also KESSLER, supra note 27, at 390;
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 984.
'41 See Avenant 48, Annexe A, art. 17(1). See also KESSLER, supra note 27, at 390;
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 984.
14S See Avenant 48, Annexe A, art. 18. See also Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at 115.
See Avenant 48, Annexe A, art. 19; Avenant 48, Annexe E. See also KESSLER, supra note
27, at 388; Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at 115; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 992-93. The
"Association pour la Structure Financiete" pays for the extra cost through a variety of
contributions. See Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at 115; KESSLER, supra note 27, at 388.
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Surviving spouses and surviving former spouses who have not remarried
are entitled to a benefit equal to 60% of their deceased spouse's benefit." °
Orphaned children under the age of 21 are entitled to a benefit equal to 50%
of their deceased parents' benefit until they reach the age of 21.'s'
3. AGIRC
Unlike ARRCO, AGIRC only covers managers,15 and it only covers the
wages' of managers between the general regime ceiling and eight times that
ceiling.' 5' For purposes of AGIRC, wages between the general regime ceiling
and four times that ceiling are typically referred to as level B wages while
wages between four times the general regime ceiling and eight times that
ceiling are typically referred to as level C wages.'
a. AGIRC's Funding Provisions
Just as ARRCO's funding provisions have evolved considerably over the
last decade, so too have AGIRC's funding provisions. Prior to 1991, AGIRC
only covered the wages of managers between the general regime ceiling and
four times that ceiling."5 6 In 1991, however, AGIRC began to mandate
contributions on wages between four times the general regime ceiling and
eight times that ceiling.'5 Prior to accords signed on February 9, 1994, and
April 24, 1996, the rates imposed on the two levels could be different, and
'so See Avenant 48, Annexe A, arts. 27 & 28. See also DUPEYRoUX, supra note 2, at 984;
KESSLER, supra note 27, at 389. The survivor may begin to collect this benefit at age 55. See
Avenant 48, Annexe A, arts. 27 & 28. See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 984; KESSLER,
supra note 27, at 388.
"I, See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 389; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 985.
152 For a discussion of the definition of managers for purposes of AGRIC, see KESSLER,
supra note 27, at 393-94; Memo social 2000, at 1217-18; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 988.
... As in ARRCO, wages for purposes of AGIRC have been defined as essentially the same
as wages for purposes of the general regime since January 1, 1996. See Convention Collective
Nationale de Retraite et de Prdvoyance des Cadres du 14 mars 1947 et Deliberations prises pour
son application, Mise Ajour janvier 1998, art. 5 [hereinafter AGIRC Convention]; KESSLER,
supra note 27, at 398; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 989 n.3.
"u See AGIRC Convention, art. 6; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 989. AGIRC provides death
benefits in addition to retirement benefits, and contributions for death benefits include wages
up to the general regime ceiling. See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 395; Memo social 2000, at
1219. This Article will only address the retirement benefits provided by AGIRC.
,s' See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 990.
,' See id.; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 29.
,17 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 990.
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voluntary contributions were permitted."' Pursuant to the February 9, 1994,
and April 24, 1996, accords, contribution rates on both level B and level C
wages were gradually increased to 16% beginning in 1999, and voluntary
contributions were eliminated. ' 9 Contributions on level B wages are divided
between the employer and employee so that the employer pays 10% of level
B wages while the employee pays 6% of level B wages."6 The way in which
level C wages are divided between employer and employee varies from
employer to employer. 6'
Like contributions to ARRCO, x contributions to AGIRC are subject to a
"taux d'appel" or calling rate. '" Since 1995, the calling rate has been 125%.'"
In addition, the April 24, 1996 accord created an exceptional temporary
contribution that will gradually increase from .07% and .35% in 2001 .16' Like
the calling rate, these exceptional temporary contributions do not give rise to
points and are designed to stabilize benefit levels.'"
b. AGIRC's Benefit Provisions
Like ARRCO, AGIRC uses a points system to calculate benefits. 167 Each
year AGIRC defines the cost of a point, or the "reference wage,"'68 and
managers acquire a number of points that is directly proportional to their
contributions (and the contributions their employers make on their behalf 69)
See id.
"' See AGIRC Convention, art. 6; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 990.
'"See AGIRC Convention, art. 6, § 2(D); KESSLER, supra note 27, at 398.
161 See AGIRC Convention, art. 6, § 3(C); KESSLER, supra note 27, at 398.
162 See section on ARRCO's Funding Provisions, p. 464.
163 See AGIRC Convention, Annexe III, art. I; KESSLER, supra note 27, at 398; DUPEYROUX,
supra note 2, at 990. See also LYNES, supra note 48, at 56-57 (noting that between 1952 and
1965, calling rate was less than 100%).
' See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 398; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 990. Between 1952
and 1966, the calling rate was less than 100%. See id.
'" See AGIRC Convention, Annexe III, art. 2; KESSLER, supra note 27, at 398; DUPEYROUx,
supra note 2, at 990 n. 1. When the rate was .07% in 1997, the employer was required to pay
.045% while the employee was required to pay .025%. When the rate reaches .035%, the
employer will be required to pay .22% while the employee will pay .13%. See id. The
exceptional contribution is based on all of the manager's wages. See AGIRC Convention,
Annexe III, art. 2; KESSLER, supra note 27, at 398.
' See AGIRC Convention, Annexe III, art. 2; KESSLER, supra note 27, at 398.
167 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 991; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 40.
'" See AGIRC Convention, Annexe I, art. 2; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 991. The
reference wage is adjusted each year based on the change in the median salary of covered
workers. See Memo social 2000, at 1224.
169 As discussed above, contributions for purposes of acquiring points are based on
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for the year.70 Traditionally, managers could also accrue points for past
services and during certain periods of unemployment, disability, and military
service,' 7 ' but these provisions are gradually being eliminated. 72  Each
manager is also guaranteed a certain minimum number of points each year
regardless of the amount of contributions made on his behalf. "' Currently, the
guaranteed minimum number of points is 1202 74 Each worker's pension is
then equal to the total number of points accrued over her career multiplied by
the value of a point, which is fixed each year.
71
As in ARRCO, in theory, the reference wage, once set, is a statistical
constant that increases with increases in the average wage while the value of
a point depends on the amount of money contributed to the regime and the
number of retirees collecting benefits that year.176 In fact, however, the social
partners have the power to use different rules to set the reference wage and
value of points and have done so.'" For example, for the years 1996 through
2000, the reference wage was indexed to the growth in the average annual
wage plus four percent' while the value of points was indexed to increases
in average wages minus one percent for the years 1996 through 2000.'"7
"contractual" mandatory contributions and voluntary contributions. Actual contributions due
to the calling rate are not taken into account. Thus, a point may actually cost more than the
reference wage.
170 See AGIRC Convention, Annexe I, art. 3; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 991; REYNAUD,
supra note 7, at 40.
'71 See AGIRC Convention, Annexe I, arts. 8, 8 bis, 8 ter; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 991
n.2; KESSLER, supra note 27, at 398.
'7 See Accord du 25 avril 1996 relatif au regime de retraite des cadres AGIRC art. 7; section
on reductions in benefits, infra p. 477.
'" See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 396; Memo social 2000, at 1219.
'7 See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 396; Memo social 2000, at 1220. When voluntary
contributions were permitted, the guaranteed minimum number of points could vary from
employer to employer depending on the employer's contribution rate. See KESSLER, supra note
27, at 396; Memo social 2000, at 1219-20.
17s See AGIRC Convention, Annexe I, arts. 1, 37; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 992;
REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 40. As of 1996, the average AGIRC pension was 3742 francs. See
Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 2, supra note 139, at 13. See also E-mail correspondence from
Arnauld d'Yvoire, Secrttaire-Gtn6ral, Observatoire des Retraites, to Kathryn Moore, March 21,
2001 (explaining that AGIRC uses a complex mathematical formula to fix the value of points
each year that takes into account benefits to be paid over the next ten years and allows a reserve)
(on file with author).
176 See id. See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 977.
'7 See E-Mail Correspondence from Arnaud d'Yvoire, supra note 140.
'7n See Accord du 25 Avril 1996 Relatifaux Regimes de Retraite des Cadres AGIRC, art. 1.
'79 Seeid. at art 2.
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As of 2001, the reference wage, or cost, of an AGIRC point was 26.79
francs while the value of a point was 2.4126 francs. Retirees who have
raised 3 or more children are entitled to increased benefits. Traditionally,
benefits were increased by 10% for 3 children, 15% for 4 children, 20% for 5
children, 25% for 6 children, and 30% for 7 or more children,'' but these
additional benefits have been reduced for active workers.8 2 Surviving spouses
and surviving former spouses who have not remarried are entitled a benefit
equal to 60% of the deceased spouse's benefit.8 3 Orphaned children under the
age of 21 are entitled to a benefit equal to 30% of their deceased parents'
benefit.'8
As in ARRCO, the normal retirement age is theoretically 65, and benefits
are decreased for individuals who begin to collect retirement benefits before
age 65."5 In fact, however, individuals who fulfill the requirements for
retirement at the full rate in the general regime prior to age 65 may receive full
benefits from AGIRC at that time.'"
C. Third Tier
The third tier of the French retirement system consists of optional
supplemental retirement plans. Principally because of the size and signifi-
cance of the obligatory retirement regimes, optional supplemental retirement
"o See Param~tres de calcul de la retraite 2001 (visited Sept. 17,2001) <http://www.agirc.
fr/Regimne/Chiffres/fchiffres.htm>.
"' See AGIRC Convention, Annexe I, art. 6 bis; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 992.
n2 See Reduction in Benefits, infra p. 477.
". See AGIRC Convention, Annexe I, art. 12, 13 quater, 13 quinquies; DUPEYROUX, supra
note 2, at 992. Generally, the survivor may not begin to collect this benefit until age 60. See
AGIRC Convention, Annexe I, art. 12; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 992 & n.2. If, however,
the surviving spouse has at least 2 dependent children under the age of 21, the survivor may
begin to collect benefits regardless of age. See AGIRC Convention, Annexe I, art. 13.
'" See AGIRC Convention, Annexe I, art. 13 bis; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 992.
'a See AGIRC Convention, Annexe I, art. 6. See also Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at 115.
'8 See AGIRC Convention, Annexe V; Blanchet & PI66, supra note 2, at 115; DUPEYROUX,
supra note 2, at 992-93. The "Association pour ia Structure Financi re" pays for the extra cost
through a variety of contributions. See Blanchet & P116, supra note 2, at 115; DUPEYROUX,
supra note 2, at 992-93.
20011
GA. J. INT'L & COM. L.
plans play a minor role in the French retirement system.' 7 For example, in
1995, these plans only provided about 2 percent of total retirement benefits.'"
In 1997, the French legislature sought to expand the third tier by enacting
legislation creating "plans d'epargne retraite" or retirement savings plans.' 9
The legislation, however, was highly controversial, and the government that
came into power shortly after the legislation was enacted declined to
promulgate the decrees required to give effect to the legislation.'"
This section will begin by giving a general overview of optional supple-
mental retirement plans in the private sector.'9 ' It will then discuss the
legislation creating retirement savings plans.
1. Optional Supplemental Retirement Plans
Optional supplemental retirement plans can be put into operation in one of
three ways: (1) directly by the employer, (2) through a supplementary
retirement institution, or (3) by contracting with one of three "classic"
insurance organizations.'92 There are no precise figures on the number of
optional supplemental retirement plans put into operation directly by
- 18 See BGUERIE, supra note 27, at 465 (noting that base regimes and complementary
regimes have left little space for the development of supplementary retirement regimes); Laigre
& Mascomere, supra note 29, at 10 (attributing limited development of supplemental retirement
regimes to weight of mandatory retirement regimes and availability (now being phased out) of
supplemental contributions to ARRCO and AGIRC); REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 54 (explaining
that mandatory complementary retirement regimes leave little room for optional supplemental
retirement plans); Francois Durin, Regimes surcomplementaires elfonds de pension, DR. Soc.
136, 138 (1992) (same).
"' See Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at 19. See also BtGUEREE, supra note 27, at 465
n.248 (noting that according to a 1986 study less than 5% of ARRCO beneficiaries were
estimated to benefit from a supplementary retirement plan while according to 1989 survey 6.6%
of AGIRC beneficiaries were estimated to receive supplementary retirement benefits).
9 See Legislation Creating Retirement Savings Plans, p. 468.
190 See id.
91 For a description of the two optional supplemental retirement plans in the public sector,
see JACQUES NIKONOFF, LA COMEDIE DES FONDS DE PENSION: UNE FAILLITI INTELLECTUELLE
245-46 (1999); Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1, supra note 30, at 24; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at
61-64. For a discussion of optional retirement plans for non-salaried workers, see NIKONOFF,
supra note 191, at 243-44; Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1, supra note 30, at 23-24. For a
description of "indemniti6s de depart a la retraite" and "contrat individuel d'assurance-retraite,"
two products that may also provide supplemental retirement income, see PATRICKTURBOT, LES
FONDS DEPENSION 109-10 (2d ed. 1998); Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1, supra note 30, at 24-25;
Laigre, Mascomere, supra note 29, at 108-10.
"9 See BtGUERE, at 467; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 997; Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1,
supra note 30, at 18; Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at 86.
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employers,'93 but they are generally believed to be limited in number. 94 The
plans are typically defined benefit plans.'" They may be integrated plans that
promise participants a percentage of their final (or final average) salary that
takes into account benefits provided by the mandatory retirement regimes,
96
or they may be non-integrated plans that promise a benefit that is independent
of the benefits provided by the mandatory regimes.'9' The plans usually
impose a minimum service requirement, which can be as long as fifteen years,
and require that the employee be working for the employer at the time of
retirement in order to be eligible for benefits." Typically, the benefits are
funded solely by the employer.'" Article 9 of the Commerce Code requires
that the employer indicate the amount of its liability for supplementary
retirement benefits in an annex to its annual balance sheet,2" and permits, but
" See Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at 13 (noting that the amount of supplemental
retirement benefits put into operation directly by employers is not known); REYNAUD, supra
note 7, at 56 (same). Cf. BtGuERIE, supra note 27, at 469 n.268 (citing 1991 article that
estimated total obligations for employer-operated supplemental retirement pension and end of
career indemnities equal to 14 billion francs for Elf Acquitaine, 9 billion francs for Pechiney,
and 7 billion francs for Saint Gobain).
'" See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 435 (stating that these types of supplemental retirement
plans rarely used); BtGUERIE, supra note 27, at 469 (stating that this form of supplemental
retirement plan occupies a marginal place in the supplemental retirement scheme). But see
REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 56 (speculating that scope of this form of plan is probably
significant).
' See Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1, supra note 30, at 18; Laigre & Mascomere, supra note
29, at 20. A defined benefit plan is a retirement plan in which the benefit is expressed as a
certain amount to be paid at the participant's retirement. For a more detailed discussion of
defined benefit plans, see Kathryn L. Moore, PartialPrivatization of Social Security: Assessing
its Effect on Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 65 MO. L. REV. 341, 347-48
(2000); LAUTRETrE, supra note 27, at 71-72; Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at 25.
196 For example, they may promise a benefit that equals 75% of final pay after the mandatory
retirement regime benefits are taken into account. See Memo social 1229 (2000); BtGUERIE,
supra note 27, at 469 & n.272; Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at 20.
'7 For example, they may promise a benefit equal to 2% of final average pay. See Memo
social 1229 (2000); BtGUERIE, supra note 27, at 470; Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at
20.
1" See Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at 23. See also Laigre, supra note 27, at 415
(questioning whether these provisions violate European Community law which requires free
movement of workers).
' See Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at 21. If the employer accepts employee
contributions, those contributions must be paid to an external organization and not directly to
the employer. See id.
O See C. COM., art. 9, a] 2.
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does not require, the employer to include in its annual balance sheet a reserve
to offset some or all of this liability.20'
Like American pension trust funds,0' supplementary retirement institutions
are entities that are legally separate from the employer and have the sole
purpose of providing benefits that supplement those provided by the manda-
tory retirement regimes.0 3 In 1994, there were about 125 supplemental
retirement institutions that paid about 4.5 billion francs in benefits;'3 most of
the institutions were funded on a pay-as-you go basis,25 and about one-half
were closed to new participants.2' A law enacted in August 1994207 limited
the creation of new supplementary retirement institutions"" and requires that
benefits accrued or in the course of accrual after August 1994 be vested.20,
Like plans put into operation directly by the employer, plans operated by
supplemental retirement institutions are typically defined benefit plans.
2 1
Finally, optional supplemental retirement plans may be put into operation
by "socits d'assurance," ' ' "institutions deprevoyance, ' 2 or "mutuelles. ' '213
2o See id. al 3. But see Laigre, supra note 198, at 414 (contending that art. L. 913-2 of the
social security code, enacted in 1994, which declares null any provision in a convention, accord,
or unilateral action of the employer that would bring about the loss of retirement benefits that
have been accrued or are in the course accrual, requires that employer provide greater protection
of benefits than that mandated by the Commerce Code).
m See Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1, supra note 30, at 19 (stating that supplementary
retirement institutions constitute "exactly" pension funds in the Anglo-saxon sense of the term).
2 See Soc. Sec. Code art. L 941-1(1); Laigre, Mascomere, supra note 29, at 89.
24 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 997.
2 See Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1, supra note 30, at 20.
"6 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 997 n.5; Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1, supra note 30,
at 19; Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at 90; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 54-55. Cf.
BtGUERIE, supra note 27, at 468 (stating that about 2/3 are closed).
207 See Loi no. 94-678 du 8 aofit 1994 relative i la protection sociale compl6mentaire des
salaries et portant transposition des directives no 92-49 et no 92-62 des 18 juin et 10 novembre
1992 du Conseil des communautes europenes, J.O. 11655 (1994).
2 Specifically, new supplemental retirement institutions may only be created by enterprises
that join ARRCO and AGIRC after August 8, 1994. See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 941-1(11);
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 997 & n.6.
2 See Social Security Code art. L. 941-2. How effective the law is in enforcing this
guarantee is subject to debate. See Philippe Laigre, supra note 27, at 411 (critiquing the law).
210 See Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1., supra note 30, at 19.
m Societ6s d'assurance are governed by the code d'assurance. For a discussion of societ6s
d'assurance and the rules that govern them, see KESSLER, supra note 27, at 426-27; Laigre &
Mascomere, supra note 29, at 87.
2.. Institutions de prevoyance are governed by the social security code. For a discussion of
institutions de prevoyance and the rules that govern them, see KESSLER, supra note 27, at 423-
26; Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at 87-88.
213 Mutuelles are governed by the code de la mutualit6. For a discussion of mutuelles and
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In 1993, optional supplemental retirement plans put into operation by these
three "classic" insurance organizations paid about 5 billion francs in
benefits.2 4 Unlike the first two types of plans, plans created by contracting
with an insurance organization are typically defined contribution plans.2 " The
plans may credit contributions to an individual account for each participant
216,and provide participants with a life annuity upon retirement, or they may
credit participants with points or units and base benefits on the number of
points or units accrued and the value of those points or units. 2t 7 Unlike the
defined benefit plans, the defined contribution plans typically do not require
that the employee be working for the employer at the time of retirement in
order to be eligible for retirement benefits.21
2. Legislation Creating Retirement Savings Plans
Unlike the American retirement system and the retirement systems in many
other developed countries, the French retirement system is financed almost
entirely on a pay-as-you go basis; only about one percent of French retirement
benefits are prefunded.1 9 In March 1997, the French legislature sought to
increase the level of prefunded benefits in France by enacting a law creating
retirement savings plans' 2 which would institutionalize a third tier of
prefunded retirement benefits." The retirement savings plans, which were
the rules that govern them, see KESSLER, supra note 27, at 419-23; Laigre & Mascomere, supra
note 29, at 88-89.
214 See Laigre, supra note 27, at 416.
2"5 See Laigre & Mascomere, supra note 29, at 24.
216 See id. at 24-25.
217 See id. at 25-26.
211 See BtGUERIE, supra note 27, at 471.
29 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 1012 & n.1 (noting that in contrast 30% of benefits in
the Netherlands, 20% of benefits in the United Kingdom, and 17% of benefits in the United
States are prefunded). See also BtGUERIE, supra note 27, at 465 (noting that compared to
Germany and England, prefunded retirement regimes in France appear to be in a state of quasi-
under-development).
' See Loi no. 97-277 du 25 mars 1997 cr6ant les plans d'epargne retraite, J.0. 4657 (26
mars 1997).
" See BEGUERIE, supra note 27, at 476 (stating that this legislation was designed to
institutionalize a third tier of retirement income based on capitalization); Philippe Laigre, les
Plans d 'Epargne Retraile: la Main Visible du Marche, DR. Soc. 482, 482 (1997) (stating that
the ambition of the law, more or less expressly acknowledged, was to create in France a tier of
retirement income based on capitalization). For discussions of this legislation, see, for example,
B1tGUERIE, supra note 27, at 475-84; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 1014-18.
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much like American 401(k) plans,' were to be available to all private sector
workers covered by the general regime (or agricultural regime) and ARRCO
and AGIRC 2 and were to be managed by insurance organizations.' The
legislation was highly controversial from the outset,2' and a few months after
the law was enacted, a new government took power 26 and declined to
promulgate the 11 decrees required to give effect to the legislation." 7 As a
result, the legislation creating retirement savings plans never went into
effect,"2 and the proper role for prefunded retirement benefits remains a hotly
debated issue in France today.22
There is general agreement that the first two ties of the French retirement
system should remain funded principally' 3 on a pay-as-you go basis."3 There
22 See Lawrence J. Speer, French Government's Pension Reserve Fund Will Grow
Dramatically in Future, 26 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 2362 (Oct. 4, 1999). The principle
difference between the retirement savings plans and 401(k) plans is that the retirement savings
plans were to be distributed solely in the form of an annuity.
22 See Loi no. 97-277, supra note 220, at art. 1. In addition, lawyers covered by the "Caisse
nationale des barreaux frangais" could also participate in a retirement savings plan, as well as
French citizens living outside the country even if they were not covered by a complementary
retirement regime. See id. at art. 2.
124 See id. at art. 8.
" In fact, the Senators who opposed the legislation filed a constitutional challenge to the
legislation, but the challenge was rejected. See Decision no. 97-388 DC du 20 mars 1997, J.O.
4661 (26 mars 1997). See Lawrence J. Speer, France to Revise Law Creating First Private
Sector Pension Funds, 24 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 2194 (Sept. 29, 1997) ("Left-wing
politicians are strongly opposed to the tax-free status that the Thomas Law grants to employer
and employee contributions to private pension funds.").
'u Indeed, "[t]he current Socialist-led government came to power in mid-1997 in part on a
promise to scrap" the legislation. See Lawrence J. Speer, France Unveils Employee Savings
Plans Resembling Capitalization Pension Funds, 27 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1864, 1864
(Aug. 8, 2000).
27 In his general political declaration, the then-new Prime Minister Lionel Jospin stated that
"the dispositions recently adopted in favor of pensions which could infringe on the pay-as-you-
go regimes will be put off." See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 435-36; BtGUERIE, supra note 27,
at 481; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 1017 n.2.
m' See Lawrence J. Speer, supra note 226, at 1864 (noting that Socialist government voted
to abolish the legislation creating the retirement savings plans).
229 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 1017-18 (noting that the debate is not closed and
identifying the various approaches that may be taken); Ruellan, supra note 70, at 928 (noting
that so passionate is the debate between proponents of pay-as-you go systems and proponents
of prefunded systems that one barely dares to ask whether there is a place for prefunded regimes
in the French retirement system). See also Vasselle, supra note 92, at 52 (favoring prefunding).
,"0 The 1999 social security financing law created a small reserve to help fund future benefits
in the general and aligned regimes. See Recent Reforms ofthe French Retirement Spoken infra,
p. 474.
"' See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 161.
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is a vigorous debate, however, as to the proper scope of a third tier of
prefunded benefits.232 Proponents of prefunding contend that prefunded third
tier benefits (1) offer the opportunity for better rates of return, (2) are needed
to compensate for recent reductions in the retirement benefits provided by the
mandatory retirement regimes,233 and (3) are needed to provide essential
capital for French industry to reinforce and stabilize the French economy.'
Opponents ofprefunding point out that prefunded retirement benefits in France
in the early to mid-20th century failed to provide adequate benefits in times of
high inflation3' and contend that prefunding (1) is dangerous because it
" See, for example, authorities cited in id. at 157 n.i. See also Speer, supra note 226, at
1864, stating:
Pension funds have been a political hot potato in France throughout much of
the past decade. While most of the world's industrialized nations have added
some form of individual retirement savings to the pension mix, France stands
out for its opposition to any plan that threatens the intragenerational
solidarity-based approach of its generous, state-run pay-as-you-go system.
Lawrence J. Speer, French Regulations Law Fails to Offer Stock Option Taxation Plans, 27
PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1067 (Apr. 25, 2000) (noting that Finance Commission Chair Henri
Emmanuelli "has warned the government against any attempt to build preferential tax treatment
into personal retirement savings accounts that threatens the government-run pay-as-you-go
systen.").
23 See infra pp; 474-69 for discussion of ways in which benefits have been decreased in
general regime and ARRCO and AGIRC.
234 See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 435 & n.3 and authorities cited therein. See also Muller,
supra note 264, at 431; Lawrence Speer, Private Pension Funds Essential, France's President
Chirac Says, 26 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1838 (July 19, 1999) (noting that on July 14, 1999,
French President Jacques Chirac said, "It is essential to create a private pension fund system, to
allow people to improve their retirement, but also so that France can reclaim control of its own
companies."); France Flip-FlopsAgain on Private Pension Funds, 25 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA)
819 (Apr. 6, 1998), stating:
Through the second half of 1997, Minister of Economy and Finance
Dominique Strauss-Kahn was among the more pragmatic Socialist leaders,
arguing that private pension fund would offer a strong boost to French capital
markers, provide a logical complement to the existing retirement system and
limit the influence of foreign institutional investors on the national economy.
Strauss-Kahn since has renounced this position, primarily after the govern-
ment agreed to offer new fiscal incentives to existing institutional investors
in the 1998 budget.
235 See, e.g., Yves Saint-Jours, A propos d 'eventuelplans d 'epargne-retraite ntreprise, DL
OUVRIER 145, 145 (Avril 1999) (pointing to failure of capitalized (ROP) retirement benefits for
workers and peasants early in 20th century as one of many criticisms of third tier capitalized
retirement benefits). Cf L'avenir des systemes de retraite, supra note 32, at 4, 5 (noting that
funded pensions established late in the 19th century were reduced to almost nothing by 1945 as
a result of inflation and that France chose to fund its retirement benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis
because past periods of high inflation showed the fragility of funded systems); DUPEYROUX,
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destabilizes the international financial markets, (2) will not provide the level
of returns proponents contend, (3) will not create additional savings for French
enterprises to use, and (4) could harm the current system.236
III. RECENT REFORMS OF THE FRENCH RETIREMENT SYSTEM
France faces a demographic shift much like that in the United States.237
First, life expectancy in France is increasing. In 1950, men had a life
expectancy at birth 8 of 63.4 years while women had a life expectancy at birth
of 69.2 years.239 By 1998, men's life expectancy at birth had risen to 74.6
years while women's life expectancy at birth had risen to 82.2 years, 2' and, by
2040, men's life expectancy at birth is projected to increase to 80.9 years while
women's life expectancy at birth is projected to increase to 89.2 years.24 Not
only is life expectancy increasing, but France has a large baby boom
generationu 2 followed by relatively smaller generations.2 3 Principally as a
result of these demographic shifts,2" the elderly dependency ratio, that is, the
supra note 2, at 159 (noting that funded benefits were abandoned in 1941 because savings were
ruined between the two World Wars).
2 See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 435 & n.4 and authorities cited therein. See also KHALFA
ET AL., supra note 142 (contending that current retirement system is not in as much difficulty
as claimed and objecting to capitalization for variety of reasons); Saint-Jours, supra note 235,
at 145 (offering variety of arguments against capitalization and contending that current pay-as-
you-go system should be reinforced); Speer, supra note 225, at 2194 ("Socialist Prime Minister
Lionel Jospin told the National Assembly in June that the proposed private pension fund system
'could damage the distribution-based regime' and insisted that new debate be held on the law.").
." See INTRODUCTION supra p. 443 for a discussion of the impending demographic shift in
the United States.
' Arguably life expectancy at age 60, the age by which most French retire, is more relevant
than life expectancy at birth. L'avenir de nos retraits, a recent official report by Jean-Michel
Charpin, the Commissaire au Plan, however, refers to life expectancy at birth, not age 60. Thus,
this Article will use those figures. For a discussion of life expectancy at age 60, see Cinquante
ans, Groupe no. 1, supra note 30, at 5 (noting that life expectancy at age 60 is expected to
increase from 19 years in 1995 to 25.1 years in 2040).
29 See L "avenir de nos retraites, supra note 32, at 46.
240 See id.
24 See id.
242 See L'avenir de nos retraites, supra note 14, at 48 (noting that between 1946 and the end
of the 1960s, there were about 800,000 children born each year compared to about 650,000
between the two World Wars and that the increase was quite rapid with a little more than
500,000 born in 1940,600,000 in 1945, but 800,000 in 1946 and 830,000 in 1950).
243 In recent years, the birth rate has been, and is expected to remain at the relatively low rate
of 1.8. See CHARPIN, supra note 14, at 49; Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 1, supra note 30, at 6.
' Of course, other factors, such as the immigration rate, affect the dependency ratio. For
a detailed discussion of the assumptions underlying these projections, see CHARPIN, supra note
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ratio of retirees to working age individuals, is expected to increase from .39 in
1995 to .43 in 2010 to .71 in 2040.24 This increasing dependency ratio is
putting enormous pressure on France's retirement system because it is funded
almost exclusively on a pay-as-you go basis and thus fewer and fewer workers
must support more and more retirees.2"
As the description of the French retirement system in the preceding section
illustrates, the French retirement system has been reformed a multitude of
times in a multitude of ways over the last decade. Some of the reforms are
designed to make the system comply with European Community law."7 Other
reforms, in contrast, are designed to respond to the financial pressures the
retirement system faces as a result of the aging of the French population. This
section will focus on reforms enacted in response to those financial
pressures.2"
Generally, these reforms can be categorized in one of four ways: (1) as
increasing the contribution rate; (2) as reducing benefits; (3) as creating new
sources of funding; or (4) as reorganizing the basic structure of the system.249
14, at 45-57.
24s See id. at 53. Of course, the number of children relative to the working age population
is also relevant in determining the relative cost of an aging population. If the dependency ratio
includes children under age 20 as well as individuals aged 60 and over, the dependency ratio is
projected to increase from .87 in 1995 to .91 in 2010 to 1.19 in 2040. See id.
' See CHARPiN, supra note 14, at 81-105; J. Speer, supra note 222, at 2362 ("By most
estimates, France's extremely generous pay-as-you-go pension system will come under
unsustainable demographic pressure by 2015.').
27 For example, in 1994 AGIRC increased from age 50 to 60 the age at which survivors
benefits are available to widows and decreased from age 65 to 60 the age at which survivors
benefits are available to widowers. This was done to make the system conform with European
Community law requiring equality in the treatment of men and women. See Cinquante ans,
Groupe no. 2, supra note 139, at 14 n.3.
Similarly, a new book, Livre IX, was added to the social security code to comply with
European Community law regarding complementary retirement regimes and supplemental
retirement institutions. See Loi no. 94-678 du 8 aofit 1994 relative & la protection sociale
compl6mentaire des salaries et portant transpositions des directives no 92/49 et no 92/96 des 18
juin et 10 novembre 1992 du Conseil des Communautes europe6nes. For a critique of these
changes, see Philippe Laigre, Les institutions de retraite compidmentaire et leurs federations
apres la loi du 8 aoat 1994, DR. Soc. 306 (No. 3 Mars 1995); Philippe Laigre, La retraite
collective d'entreprise apres la Ioi du 8 aoat 1994, DL Soc. 411 (No. 4 Avril 1995).
2 Of course, some of the reforms enacted to make the system conform with European
Community law, such as amending the age at which survivors benefits are available, obviously
also have a financial impact.
'" Cf. Weaver, supra note 7, at 200 (noting that governments can respond to demographic
and other pressures facing retirement systems in three basic ways: (1) "they can try to cut back
on the generosity of'specific provisions in their pension programs"; (2) "they can refinance
pension programs, either by adding dedicated revenues like payroll taxes or general revenues";
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Using these four categories, this section will describe how the French
retirement system has been reformed over the last decade in response to the
long-term financial difficulties it faces.'
A. Increases in the Contribution Rate
The ARRCO and AGIRC mandatory contribution rates were increased
significantly over the last ten years as a result of accords signed in 1993, 1994,
and 1996. First, the ARRCO mandatory contribution rate on level A wages
gradually increased from 4% to 6% by 1999.21 In addition, the ARRCO
mandatory contribution rate on non-managers' level B wages is scheduled to
increase gradually from 6% to 16% by 2005.5 2 Finally, the AGRIC mandatory
contribution rate on managers' level B and C wages was increased from 8%
to 16% by 1999.253
Not only were the mandatory contribution rates increased during the 1990s,
but the calling rates were also increased. Specifically, both the ARRCO and
AGIRC calling rates were increased from about 120% and 117%, respectively,
to 125% by January 1995. 2-
or (3) "they can attempt to restructure their pension programs in fundamental ways-for
example by adding or deleting tiers of programs.").
' This section will not discuss every single reform of the French retirement system in the
last decade. For example, it will not discuss the September 25 and September 27, 1995,
amendments which changed the definition of wages for purposes of ARRCO and AGIRC to
conform with the definition of wages for purposes of the general regime rather than wages for
purposes of the income tax. See Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 2, supra note 139, at 25 n.2.
Similarly, this section will not discuss the failed reform of the special regimes which was also
designed to address the system's long-term funding difficulties.
"' See Accord du 10 Fevrier 1993 pris pour l'application de certaines dispositions de
l'accord du 8 dcernbre 1961 codifi6, art 1. See also ARRCO Funding Section, infra pp. 460.
2 See Accord du 25 avril 1996 relatifaux regimes de retraite compl6mentaire des salaries
ARRCO, art. 26. See also ARRCO Funding Provision, infra pp. 460.
3 See Accord du 25 avril 1996 relatif a regime de retraite des cadres AGIRC, art. 11
(accelerating scheduled increase in mandatory contribution rate on level B and C wages so that
it reaches 16% by 1999); Accord du 9 f6vrier 1994 relatif au regime de retraite des cadres,
(scheduling gradual increase in the mandatory contribution rate to reach 16% by 2003). See also
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 990; AGRIC Funding Provision, infra pp. 464.
2u See E-Mail Correspondence from Amauld d'Yvoire, supra note 140 (noting that 1994
AGRIC accord increased the calling rate from 117% to 121% in 1994 and 125% as of January
1995). The ARRCO calling rate reached 125% in 1992. See Cinquante ans, Groupe no. 2, supra
note 139, at 48 (showing ARRCO and AGIRC calling rates since 1947). In addition, Unedic,
which provides unemployment insurance and finances AGIRC and ARRCO retirement benefits
that are attributable to periods of unemployment, agreed to increase its short-term contributions
although it will later reduce its contributions to recoup these increased contributions. See E-Mail
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B. Reductions in Benefits
In 1993, the rules governing the general and aligned regimes were modified
in three ways, the effect of each of which was to reduce benefits.2" First, the
period of participation required for benefits at the full rate was gradually
increased from 150 to 160 quarters." 6 Second, the number of years taken into
account in calculating the annual average salary was gradually increased from
10 to 25.25 Finally, the method for indexing benefits was changed from a
system based on changes in wages to one based on changes in prices for a
period of five years beginning on January 1, 1994.258 The 1999 social security
financing law extended the practice of revaluing benefits based on changes in
the cost of living rather than wages through the end of 1999.259
Not only were general regime benefits reduced during the 1990s, but
ARRCO and AGIRC benefits were also reduced during this period. For
example, pursuant to a February 9, 1994 accord, AGIRC gradually reduced the
family allowance, that is, the increase in benefits it provides for workers who
Correspondence from Amauld d'Yvoire, supra note 140.
'5 See Ruellan, supra note 96, at 918.
See Decret No. 93-1022 du 27 aofit 1993 relatif au calcul des pension de retraite, Title I,
J.0. 12145, 12145-46 (Aug. 28, 1993). For a discussion ofthis provision, see infra and Ruellan,
supra note 96, at 918-19.
' See Decret No. 93-1022 du 27 aofit 1993 relatifau calcul des pension de retraite, Title II,
J.0. 12145, 12146 (Aug. 28, 1993). For a discussion of this provision, see supra p. 452 and
Ruellan, supra note 96, at 919.
28 See Loi no. 93-936, infra note 273; Decret No. 93-1023 du 27 aofit 1993 fixant les
modalit6s de revalorisation des avantages d'invalidit6 et de vieillesse, J.0. 12147 (Aug. 28,
1993); Ruellan, supra note 96, at 919-20. In fact, benefits had been indexed to changes in prices
rather than wages since 1987 as a result of a series of laws enacted each year setting a rate based
on prices rather than on wages as provided by the social security code. See Ruellan, supra note
96, at 919-20. The 1993 reform amended the law so that the government can fix the amount of
indexation by decree rather than through the parliament. See Bonoli, supra note 7, at 140. See
also Blanchet & P616, supra note 2, at 188 (noting that indexing pension on prices instead of
wages has "the effect of reducing the relative standard of living of older pensioners"); Weaver,
supra note 7, at 201 (noting that "[a]lthough most indexation reforms produce modest results
in the early years, they compound over time to produce striking results" and citing indexation
reform in Great Britain as example where indexation reform can significantly reduce benefits
over long run); supra p. 455.
29 See LAMY, PROTECTION SoCIALE 2000, at 2337; Lawrence J. Speer, France to Create
Pension Reserve Fund to Ward Off Insolvency in Next Century, 25 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA)
2230 (Sept. 28, 1998) (noting that "[i]ndexing to inflation, rather than salaries, will save the
government more than FF 10 billion (1.76 billion, at exchange rate FF 5.65 = $1) in 1999.");
Lawrence J. Speer, France Unwilling to Use Private Pension Funds Against Deficit, 25 PENs.
&BEN. REP. (BNA) 2031 (Sept. 14, 1998) (same).
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raise three or more children.2 The accord applied the reduction to both active
workers and retirees,2" but the Court of Cassation held that the reduction as
applied to retirees who had already begun to receive their retirement benefits
prior to the date of the accord constituted an impermissible retroactive
reduction in benefits.2 2 The April 25, 1996, AGIRC accord reduced benefits
by gradually eliminating all credit awarded workers during periods of
unemployment, disability, and military service,' other than the guarantee of
minimum points-equal to 120 points-for a mandatory contribution rate of
16%.2 4
In addition, the value of ARRCO and AGIRC points grew at a slower rate
in the last decade than they have in the past. In the past, the value of ARRCO
and AGIRC points was often indexed to the increase in prices. 26  In 1994,
however, AGIRC points retained the same value as they had in 1993.2  In
addition, the value of ARRCO points grew at less than the average increase in
'0 Specifically, a service percentage equal to 96% in 1995, 85% in 1996, and 80% after
January 1, 1997, was applied to the family allowance. The effect of the service percentage was
to reduce the family allowance by 4% in 1995, 15% in 1996, and 20% thereafter. See
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 992; AGIRC retraite des cadres, repond A vos questions V-VI
(Apr. 1995); L'accord AGIRC: un mauvais coup porte a la famille, Le Figaro 2-B (Feb. 23,
1994). For a discussion of the family allowance, see supra p. 465.
"' Cf. AGIRC repond A vos questions, at VI (noting that applying reduction only to current
workers would violate equity between the generations).
' See Courde Cassation (Chambre sociale) (Nov. 23,1999), DR. Soc. 333,336 (2000). See
also Partick Tillie, Droit liquides dans le regime AGIRC: la nature du droit a retraite et la
sicuritijuridique en question, DR. OUVRIER41 (Feb. 2000) (discussing decision and subsequent
modification of decision); Jean-Jacques Dupeyroux, Sur les regimes compldmentaires: bref
rappel de quelques donnies de base, DR. Soc. 409 (2000) (critiquing decision).
, See first paragraph of section on AGIRC's benefits provisions, pp. 465.
See Accord du 15 avril 1996 relatif au regime de retraite des cadres AGIRC, art. 7;
Fabienne Muller, Les accords du 25 avril 1996: un tournant pour les regimes obligatoires de
retraite complimentaire?, 32 Revue de Droit Sanitaire Sociale 647, 654 (1996).
2 See KHALFA ET AL., supra note 142, at 138.
266 See February 9, 1994 AGIRC accord, art. 1. See also Phillipe de Caigny, Crise de la
retraite des cadres: des solutions bonne ou mauvaises, DR Soc. 322, 323 (2000) (noting that
the social partners decided not to modify the value of a point in 1994).
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wages in 1993 through 2000."' Similarly, the value of AGIRC points grew at
one percent less than the average increase in wages between 1996 and 2000.268
Moreover, the reference wage, or cost of points, increased between 1996
and 2000. Traditionally, the reference wage was indexed to the increase in the
average annual salary. 269 Between 1996 and 2000, however, the AGIRC
reference wage increased at the rate of the increase in the average wage plus
4%270 while the ARRCO reference wage increased at the rate of the increase
in the average wage plus 3.5%.27 This change had the effect of attributing
fewer points to the same contribution and thus decreasing future benefits.
According to management, the combined effect of the 1993 amendments
to the general regime and the modifications to ARRCO and AGIRC produced
by the February 10, 1993, February 9, 1994, and April 25, 1996 ARRCO and
AGIRC accords was to reduce the replacement rates for non-manager from
73% of final average salary in 1996 to 71% of final average salary in 2005 and
to reduce the replacement rates for managers from 66% of final average salary
in 1996 to 62% of final average salary in 2005.272
267 The February 10, 1993 ARRCO accord decreased the "rendement de reference" from
13.8% in 1992 to 13.62% in 1993, 13.46% in 1994, and 13.3% in 1995. See February 10, 1993
ARRCO Accord, art. 2. The "rendement de reference" is a complex notion which takes into
account a variety of factors such as the value of a point, the reference wage, adjustments for
family benefits, and administrative expenses. See Jacques Amzallag, Dispositions de 'accord
du JOf4vrier 1993: Deux series de mesures, LA RETRAITE COMPLEMENTAIRE ARRCO 6, 7
(1993). As a result of the reduction in the rendement de reference, the social partners decided
to revalue points at 1.2% less than the average increase in wages in 1993 and 1% less than the
average increase in wages in 1994 and 1995. See id. The remainder of the decrease in the
rendement de reference was offset by a reduction in administrative charges. See id.
The April 25, 1996 ARRCO accord continued to increase the value of points at less than
the average increase in salary until 2000. See Accord du 25 avril 1996 relatif aux regimes de
retraite complementaire des salaries ARRCO, arts. 17, 19.
See Accord du 25 avril 1996 relatif au regime de retraite des cadres AGIRC, art. 2.
2 See KHALFA ET AL., supra note 142, at 138; Lynes, supra note 48, at 44 ("the broad
intention is that the number of points earned by the average cadre [manager] in the course of a
year should be kept roughly constant from year to year, by raising the price of a point (salaire
de refirence) in line with average earnings. Since 1957 the index used for this purpose is that
of the median salary of a cadre.").
270 See Accord du 25 avril 1996 relatifau regime retraite des cadres AGIRC, art. I. See also
E-Mail Correspondence from Arnaud d'Yvoire to Kathryn Moore, supra note 140 (noting that
decision to increase the reference wage at a higher rate than the increase in the average wage
constituted a fundamental rupture with prior practice and theory).
271 See Accord du 25 avril 1996 relatif aux regimes de retraite complementaire des salaries
ARRCO, art. 18.
272 See Caussat, supra note 94, at 732-33. Cf Muller, supra note 264, at 652 (noting that
according to CGT, the Confederation General du Travail, the effect of the accords was to reduce
the rights of non-managers by 17.5% and the rights of managers by 20% in five years).
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C. Creation of New Sources of Funding
In the 1990s, two new sources of funding were created to help fund first tier
retirement benefits. First, in 1993, the "fonds de solidarit6 vieillesse" (FSV),
was created to provide funding for certain non-contributory retirement
benefits. 273  Specifically, it provides funding for (1) minimum retirement
benefits,2 74 (2) additional benefits awarded retirees for raising children,275 (3)
additional benefits awarded certain retirees with dependent spouses, 276 and (4)
benefits based on certain periods for which workers are credited with
participation in a base regime even though they made no contribution to the
regime during that period.277 The FSV is funded by a tax on alcoholic and non-
alcoholic beverages, 278 a 6% tax on employer contributions to fund employee
273 See Loi no. 93-936 du 22juillet 1993 relative aux pensions de retraite eta la sauvegarde
de la protection sociale, J.O. 10374 (23 juillet 1993), codified at Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-1-
135-6. Law 93-936, Law 93-936, Title I. Prior to the creation of the FSV, these noncontributary
benefits were either funded by the each retirement regime, by a fund financed by all of the
regimes, or reimbursed by the State. See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 467. See also Bonoli,
supra note 7, at 138 (contending that the creation of FSV was added to the 1993 reform in
response to pressure of trade unions and was essential to the political success of the 1993 reform
of the general regime); Jean-Francois Chadelat, Le Fonds de solidariti viedilesse, DL SOC. 727,
730 & 733 (July-Aug. 1994) (contending that the creation of the FSV is particularly significant
and praiseworthy because it involves the creation of an administrative organization that, for the
first time, clearly separates benefits attributable to contributions from those attributable to
"national solidarity").
274 See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-2(1) & (2); DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 467; Ruellan,
supra note 96, at 917. For a description of these minimum retirement benefits, see DUPEYROUX,
supra note 2, at 1131-35; REYNAUD, supra note 7, at 19-20. This was the only element of the
1993 reforms to affect all of the first tier retirement regimes, including the special regimes. The
remaining elements of the 1993 reforms only affected the general and aligned regimes. See
Ruellan, supra note 96, at 918.
275 See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-2(3)(a); DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 467; Ruellan, supra
note 70, at 917. For a discussion of the adjustment as applied to the general regime, see section
on adjustments to benefits.
276 See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-2(3)(b); DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 467; Ruellan, supra
note 96, at 917. For a discussion of the adjustment as applied to the general regime, see section
on adjustments to benefits.
27 See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-2(4) & 135-7; DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 467; Ruellan,
supra note 70, at 917. Those periods include periods of unemployment and national service.
For a discussion of these periods, see section on participation.
' See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-3(2); DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 466; Ruellan, supra
note 70, at 918.
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welfare benefits, 79 and 1.3% of the proceeds of the "Contribution Sociale
G~n6ralise" (CSG)28
Second, article 2 of the 1999 social security financing law created a reserve
to help fund future general and aligned regime retirement benefits.28" The
reserve is managed by the FSV and is financed from a variety of sources.2 2
The reserve held about 2 billion francs by September 1999283 and was expected
to grow to approximately 23.4 billion francs by the end of 2000.284
In addition, during the 1990s, a number of new sources of funding were
created to help fund AGIRC. First, the February 9, 1994, AGIRC accord
authorized the imposition of an exceptional "solidarity" contribution by
retirees to fund benefits attributable to periods of unemployment,285 although
this "solidarity" contribution has not yet been put into effect.2 In addition,
the February 9, 1994, AGIRC accord required certain categories of unem-
ployed managers to pay in part for points attributable to their unemploy-
279 See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-3(3); DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 781-82. This source
of funding was not part of the original FSV but was added in 1996.
'o See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-3(1); DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 466; Ruellan, supra
note 70, at 917-18. The FSV was amended in 1998 to provide for additional CSG funding. See
Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-3(4). The CSG consists of four distinct levies: (1) a levy on income
from employment or other sources of income designed to replace employment income, such as
pensions, see Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 136-1-5, (2) a levy on income from property, see Soc. Sec.
Code art. L. 136-6, (3) a levy on investment income, see Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 136-7, and (4)
a levy on gambling winnings, see Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 136-7-1.
"' See Loi no. 98-1194 du 23 d6cembre 1998, Loi de financement de ]a s6curit6 sociale pour
1999; COUR DES COMPTES, supra note 2, at 136. See also Speer, supra note 92, at 830;
Lawrence J. Speer; France to Create Pension Reserve Fund to Ward Off Insolvency in Next
Century, 25 PENs. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 2530 (Nov. 2, 1998); Lawrence J. Speer, France to
Create Pension Reserve Fund to Ward Off Insolvency in Next Century, 25 PENs. & BEN. REP.
(BNA) 2230 (Sept. 28, 1998).
In contrast, the April 25,1996 ACCRO and AGIRC accords did not consider increasing
their reserves beyond their current reserves equal to about 6 months or so of benefits. See
Caussat, supra note 94, at 733.
282 For a discussion of the sources of funding for the reserve, see COURS DE COMPTES, at 136-
37; Speer, supra note 222; Speer, supra note 92, at 830.
283 See Speer, supra note 222, at 2362.
"u See COUR DES COMPTES, supra note 2, at 137.
2's See February 10, 1994 AGIRC accord, art. 5. The Court of Cassation held that this
contribution was permissible and did not constitute an impermissible retroactive reduction in
benefits. Cour de Cassation (Chambre sociale) (Nov. 23, 1999), DR. SOC. 333, 334 (2000).
'8 See Accord du 25 avril 1996 relatifau regime de retraite des cadres AGIRC, art. 3 (noting
that the exceptional solidarity contribution will not apply between 1996 and 1999). See also E-
mail correspondence from Arnauld d'Yvoire, supra note 140 (noting that this contribution has
not been used in practice).
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ment.2 7 Finally, the April 25, 1996, AGIRC accord required workers to make
an exceptional temporary contribution to help fund AGIRC.2 8 The contribu-
tion will gradually increase from .07% in 1997 to .35% in 2001, is divided
between the employer and employee in the same manner as contributions on
level B wages are divided, 9 and does not give rise to benefits.2'
D. Reorganization of Basic Structure of System
Effective January 1, 1999, ARRCO was transformed from an association
managing 45 different complementary retirement regimes29 into a federation
managing a single complementary retirement regime with a single set of rules,
including a single reference wage and a single value for points. 292 In addition,
the financing systems of ARRCO and AGIRC were restructured so that
ARRCO (which is currently financially sound) 293 transfers money each year
to AGIRC (which is facing serious short-term funding difficulties).29' This
transfer of funds is justified by the fact that AGIRC's short-term funding
difficulties are caused in large part2 95 by the fact that the general regime ceiling
has risen much more rapidly than the average wage in recent years and thus
managers (whose wages are covered by ARRCO up to the general regime
" See E-mail correspondence from Amauld d'Yvoire, supra note 140; de Caigny, supra
note 266, at 323.
2 See Accord du 25 avril 1996 relatif au regime de retraite des cadres AGIRC, art. 7.
"9 See AGIRC's Funding Provisions section (explaining that contributions on level B wages
are divided so that the employer pays 10% of level B wages while the employee pays 6%).
290 See id.
29 See KESSLER, supra note 27, at 386 (noting that prior to January 1, 1999, ARRCO
managed 45 different complementary retirement regimes); DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 986
(same).
m See Accord du 25 avril 1996 relatif aux regimes de retraite compl6mentaire des salaries
ARRCO, art. 1; Accord du 25 avril 1996 portant dispositions communes A I'AGIRC et A
I'ARRCO, preamble. See also Muller, supra note 264, at 649 (discussing single ARRCO
regime).
293 Prior to the 1996 accords, ARRCO faced a 37 billion franc deficit while AGIRC faced a
130 billion franc deficit. See Retraites compl6nentaires AGIRC-ARRCO, Accords du 25 avril
1996, Liaisons Sociales: Le Quotidien, Supplement au numero 12170 (May 3, 1996); Muller,
supra note 264, at 648.
29 See Accord du 25 avril 1996 portant dispositions communes & I'AGIRC et A I'ARRCO,
art. 1. The transfer is calculated by comparing ARRCO and AGIRC's respective "rendements"
each year and transfering funds to the regime with the weaker "rendements." See id.; Caussat,
supra note 94, at 731. For an explanation of the term "rendements," see [number of footnotes
above].
, For adiscussion of other factors causing AGIRC's funding difficulties, see Caussat, supra
note 94, at 731.
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ceiling) are contributing more and more to ARRCO while they are contributing
less and less to AGIRC each year." s This financial restructuring may
constitute a first step toward fusing ARRCO and AGIRC into a single
regime."
IV. LESSONS FROM THE RECENT REFORMS
Reform of the French retirement system remains a work-in-progress.
Reports continue to be issued and proposals debated. 29 Indeed, both French
President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin have expressly
discussed the need for additional reform of the French retirement system.29
Nevertheless, reform thus far offers a number of lessons.
First, the United States is not alone. The French retirement system, and
indeed the retirement systems throughout the industrialized world, face serious
funding difficulties. In fact, if anything, considering reform of the French
retirement system should give American policymakers comfort because the
French retirement system faces more serious funding difficulties than does the
American retirement system.
29 See DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 980; Caussat, supra note 94, at 731; Muller, supra note
264, at 854. Coverage for wages up to the general regime ceiling was transferred from AGIRC
to ARRCO in 1973 to help ARRCO with funding difficulties it faced at that time. See
DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 981; Muller, supra note 264, at 648.
29 See Caussat, supra note 94, at 731 (noting that an impartial observer could not help but
think that the1996 accords which simultaneously negotiated changes in ARRCO and AGIRC
constitute a first breach in the social wall which separates managers from non-managers, a wall
that only exists in France). See also DUPEYROUX, supra note 2, at 981 (noting that transfer of
funds from ARRCO to AGIRC only justified if it constitutes first step in fusion of ARRCO and
AGIRC).
29 See, e.g., L 'avenir des systemes de retraite, supra note 32; Vasselle, supra note 92;
L'avenir de nos retraits, supra note 14.
2 See L 'avenir des systemes de retraite, supra note 32, at 3.
300 See Thomas Daschle, Administration Urge Early Talks, Action on Entitlements, 23 PENS.
& BEN. REP. (BNA) 2785 (Dec. 2, 1996) (noting that among the Group of Seven industrial
powers, the net present value of the U.S. public pension liability is the second lowest while that
of France is the highest). See also Lessons, supra note 7, at 113-14 (statement of Eric Kingson),
stating:
One lesson that comes from the foreign experience is that we're really not
alone, and that we're really not that bad off either. Most industrialized
nations are experiencing population aging .... and in fact, their rates of
population aging are much greater than our own. They anticipate higher rates
of so-called age dependency rates in 2030.
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The French retirement system faces more serious funding difficulties for
two principle reasons. First, the elderly dependency ratio3' is currently greater
and is projected to remain greater in France than in the United States through
the year 2050.302 Second, the entire French retirement system is funded almost
exclusively on a pay-as-you-go basis3.3 while only the American social
security system is funded principally on a pay-as-you go basis.3°  Unlike
ARRCO and AGIRC, employer-sponsored retirement benefits in the United
States are almost entirely prefunded3°5 and employer-sponsored pension plans
held over 3 trillion dollars in assets in 1996.'
The second lesson reform of the French retirement system teaches is that
there is no magic solution, no costless remedy to the impending financial
difficulties the American social security system faces as a result of the aging
of its population.30 7 Reform of the French retirement system has taken four
basic forms: (1) increases in the contribution rate; (2) reductions in benefits;
(3) creation of new sources of funding; and (4) reorganization of the basic
structure of the system. As discussed below, however, none of these types of
reform offers a costless remedy to the American social security system's long-
term funding deficit.
First, raising the American social security payroll tax rate (for employees
and employers combined) by 2.2 percentage points in 2000 could resolve more
30 For a discussion of the elderly dependency ratio, see infra p. 474.
' See Weaver, supra note 7, at 198 Table 5-5. Specifically, the elderly dependency ratio
in France was about 23.6 in 2000 and is projected to be 24.6 in 2010,32.3 in 2020,39.1 in 2030,
and 43.5 in 2050. In the United States, in contrast, the elderly dependency ratio was about 19.0
in 2000 and is projected to be 20.4 in 2010,27.6 in 2020, 36.8 in 2030, and 2050. Id. See also
BONOLI, supra note 7, at 15 Table 1.2 (showing that population over 65 as percentage of total
population currently higher and projected to remain higher in France than in the U.S. through
2035).
' See p. 471 (noting that only 1% of French retirement benefits are prefunded).
314 Cf id. (noting that 17% of American retirement benefits are prefunded).
3' Certain nonqualified benefits for executives may be unfunded. See, e.g., JOHN H.
LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 249-5 8 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing unfunded nonqualified plans).
See Overview of French Retirement System, infra p. 445.
Cf. Weaver, supra note 7, at 223-24 ("A second lesson is that the repertoire of incremental
pension retrenchment possibilities is limited .... expecting any politically viable 'magic bullets'
to come out of foreign experience is unrealistic.").
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than 100% of social security's long-term funding deficit."' Raising the payroll
tax rate, however, involves obvious costs.
Second, social security benefits could be reduced in a number of ways to
reduce social security's long-term deficit. For example, reducing the cost of
living adjustment (COLA) by 0.5 percentage points below the consumer price
index (CPI) annually could resolve 36% of the long-term deficit while
reducing the COLA by 1 percentage point below the CPI annually could
resolve 69% of the long-term deficit.3" Increasing the number of years used
to calculate benefits from 35 to 38310 could resolve 11% of the long-term
deficit while increasing the number of years to 40 could resolve 17% of the
long-term deficit.31' Reducing benefits across the board by 3% could resolve
18% of the long-term deficit while reducing benefits across the board by 5%
could resolve 30% of the long-term deficit.31 2 Finally, eliminating the hiatus
in the currently scheduled increase in the normal retirement age and then
gradually increasing the normal retirement age to 68 could resolve 20% of the
long-term deficit while further increasing the normal retirement age to 70
could resolve 26% of the long-term deficit.313 Again, however, each and every
one of these possible reforms involves obvious costs.
3 4
Third, there are no costless new sources of funding for the American social
security system. The American social security system is already building up
a temporary reserve which will be used to fund retirement benefits for the
babyboom generation; 3t5 this temporary reserve could be increased, for
example, by increasing the payroll tax rate, but the money would still have to
come from somewhere, such as higher payroll taxes. Future benefits could be
3 Keith Fontenot, Information on the Distributional Effects of Various Social Security
Solvency Options by Gender and Income, Memorandum to Jane Ross Table 1 & Appendix 1
(May 18, 1999) (101% of the long-term funding deficit could also be resolved by raising the
payroll tax rates (for employees and employers combined) by 2.75 percentage points in 2020
and an additional 2.75 percentage points in 2050).
109 See id. at Table 1.
3 0 For a discussion of the way in which social security benefits are calculated, see Moore,
supra note 20, at 986-87.
31 See id.
312 See id.
313 See id.
3 For a detailed discussion of the costs and benefits of raising the social security retirement
ages, see Moore, supra note 1. For a discussion of the distributional effect of a variety of
proposed changes in the American social security system, see Julia Lynn Coronado et al.,
Distributional Impacts ofProposed Changes to the Social Security, in 13 TAX POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 149 (1999).
3,' See Moore, supra note 20, at 985.
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funded, in part, by other sources, such as by general revenues.316 Nevertheless,
any new source of funding would impose costs on someone somewhere.
Finally, restructuring the American social security system does not offer a
costless remedy to social security's long-term funding deficit. The French
retirement system is extremely complex and the recent restructuring and
streamlining ofthe second tier may significantly reduce administrative costs.3 7
The American social security system, in contrast, is already a single regime
with extremely low administrative costs.3 '8 Restructuring the American social
security system to reduce administrative costs simply is not a viable option.31 9
There are many who contend that the American social security system
should be restructured to meet its impending funding deficit.320 In this context,
restructuring typically means privatizing or partially privatizing the system,
that is, creating individual accounts to fund all or some retirement benefits.
321
Since the French retirement system has been and remains funded almost
3" Indeed, the 1935 Committee on Economic Security proposed that general revenues be
used to fund future benefits. See Report of the Committee on Economic Security, reprinted in
THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935 AND OTHER BASIC
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 50 (50th Anniv.
Ed. 1985), stating:
We suggest that the Federal Government make no contribution from general
tax revenues to the fund during the years in which income exceeds payment
from the funds, but that it guarantee to make contributions, when the level of
payment exceeds income from contributions and interest, sufficient to
maintain the reserve at the level of the last year in which income exceded
payments.
For the role general revenues currently play in funding social security benefits, see infra note
333.
3 See Reorganization of Basic Structure of System, supra p. 482.
3 In 2000, the cost of administering the OASI program was $2.1 billion, or about .6 percent
of OASI benefits paid that year. See 2001 ANN. REP., supra p. 436, at 3. The cost of
administering the OASDI program was $3.8 billion, or about .9 percent of OASDI benefits that
year. See id. For additional discussion of the administrative efficiency of the American social
security system, see Moore, supra note 2, at 136 n.29 and authorities cited therein.
' Indeed, restructuring the American social security system to include individual accounts
is likely only to increase administrative costs. See, e.g., Lessons, supra note 7, at 119-20, and
authorities cited therein.
'2' For a discussion of a number of the recent partial privatization proposals, see Moore,
supra note 191, at 346-47.
321 Cf. American Academy of Actuaries, supra note 5, at 26, stating:
The first task for Social Security is to determine whether to make fundamen-
tal changes in the underlying philosophy of the program or to preserve the
system in its current form. In the context of the current debate, fundamental
reform means providing all or part of benefits through individual accounts
that are pre-funded through the use of market-based securities.
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exclusively on a pay-as-you-go basis, recent reforms of the French retirement
system offer little direct guidance for the current debate regarding privatization
or partial privatization of the American social security system. The arguments
offered by opponents to expanding third tier prefunded retirement benefits in
France today and the failure of French prefunded retirement plans to provide
adequate retirement benefits in times of high inflation in the early to mid-20th
century, however, suggest that partial privatization is not the costless panacea
that its proponents contend."
The third lesson offered by reform of the French retirement system is that
reform is politically difficult." Reform of the general regime took 10 years
of discussion and governmental reports.324 Indeed, according to one commen-
tator, reform was only made possible by the unique combination of a
government that was recently installed with a strong majority and an economic
crisis without precedent.3'2 Reform of the third tier of the French retirement
system, in contrast, arguably cost the majority government its power in
1997.326 In running for office in 1995, President Jacques Chirac pledged to put
" For additional arguments as to why partial privatization of social security is not a costless
solution to the American social security system's long-term funding deficit, see Moore, supra
note 191; Moore, supra note 5; Moore, supra note 2. See also THE ERISA INDUSTRY
COMMITTEE, THE VITAL CONNECTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM ON EMPLOYER-SPONSORED RETIREMENT PLANS 35 (1998), stating:
In order to restore the Social Security program to actuarial balance, Congress
must enact amendments to law that increase income to the Trust fund and/or
reduce benefits paid by the program. There are no other solutions. Contrary
to popular conception, creation of individual Social Security accounts does
not by itself solve the financial imbalance in Social Security. (emphasis in
original).
3 For a detailed study of the politics of pension reform in France in the 1980s and 1990s,
see BONOLI, supra note 7, at 118-49.
" See Francis Kessler, Les reformes de la protection sociale et les personnes agees, 32
REVUE DE DROIT SANITAIRE ET SOCIALE 781, 782 (1996) (noting that in introducing the 1995
proposed reform of the special regimes, Alain Juppl declared that it took ten years of reports and
"white books" to make the necessary choice to safeguard to the general regime in 1993).
" See Ruellan, supra note 96, at 916. See also BONOLI, supra note 7, at 138 (contending
that successful 1993 reform attributable to both strong new government and fact that Prime
Minister Balladur took unusual nonconfrontational stance with trade unions and negotiated
content of reform with trade unions).
3 See France Franks Pension Reform, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2000, at 23, stating:
When his conservative predecessor, Alain Jupp6, passed a law in 1995
favouring individual pension plans, the trade unions took to the streets. That
law, never implemented, was part of a range of social-security reforms that
led to two years of civil unrest and Mr. Jupp6's humiliation in the general
election of 1997.
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into place private pension funds similar to American 401(k) plans.327 Shortly
following the enactment of the legislation creating retirement savings plans,
which implemented this campaign promise, Chirac's center-right government
was replaced with a left-wing government whose campaign promises included
a promise to derail that legislation.328 Similarly, then-Prime Minister Alain
Jupp6's plan to reform the special regimes in 1995 was scrapped as a result of
massive public opposition." 9
The fourth and final lesson reform of the French retirement system teaches
is that funding for social security reform need not be limited to payroll taxes.
The recently created "fonds de solidarit6 viellesse" (FSV) and the reserve to
fund future retirement benefits are not financed by dedicated payroll taxes;
instead, they are financed from a variety of sources, including a tax on
alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, 30 1.3 of the proceeds of the "Contribu-
tion Sociale G~n ralis~e" (CSG) or general social contribution, 33' and capital
gains from transforming the government-run credit unions to private sector
financial institutions.332 The American social security system is currently
327 See Parliament Approves France's First Private Pension System, 24 PENS. & BEN. REP.
(BNA) 559 (Mar. 3, 1997); French Assembly Votes to Create Country's First Private Pension
System, 23 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 2793 (Dec. 2, 1996).
'" Lawrence J. Speer, New Prime Minister Rejects Proposed Private Pension Funds, 24
PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1474 (June 23, 1997).
329 See Other Base Regimes, infra p. 456.
330 See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-3(3).
331 See Soc. Sec. Code art. L. 135-3(1).
332 See Speer, supra note 92, stating:
The government has announced plans to place all surplus revenues from the
state-run social welfare system, which includes health, retirement and
unemployment insurance elements, into the pension reserve fund. Revenues
from France's wealth tax; capital gains from the transformation of
government-run credit unions to private sector financial institutions; and
dividends from government holdings in listed companies, such as France
Telecom, Renault, or Thompson Multimedia, also will feed the pension
reserve fund, Jospin said.
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funded almost exclusively by payroll taxes,333 and expanding the source of
funding beyond the payroll tax has received limited support.334
V. CONCLUSION
The most important lesson that reform of the French retirement system
teaches is that there is no easy answer, no costless remedy to the American
social security system's long-term funding deficit. Social security's long-term
funding difficulties are the inevitable result of the facts that the system has
been funded principally on a pay-as-you go basis and the population is
aging.335 Had the American social security system been prefunded from the
3 The OASI program currently receive about ten percent of its income from other sources.
Because social security is currently running a surplus, and that surplus is invested in special-
issue Treasury securities, interest on those securities provides about 8.4% of the OASI program
income. In addition, a portion of social security benefits may be subject to federal income tax.
See 26 U.S.C. § 86(a), (c) (1994). Revenues from that tax are transferred into the social security
trust fund and represent about 1.4% of the program's total income. See CONSTANTjiN W.A.
PANIS & LEE A. LILLARD, SOCIAL SECURITY: EQUITY, ADEQUACY, REFORMS 4 (Rand
Documented Briefing: Labor and Population 1996). In addition, in 1983, Congress directed that
a lump sum representing the present value of certain military service wage credits for past
service be transferred from general revenues to the social security trust funds. See Social
Security Amendments of 1983, Public L. No. 98-21, § 151,97 Stat. 65, 103-05 (1983). See also
DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 3, at 37 n.39; Myers, supra note 24, at 322-23.
" For example, all but three members of the 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council
categorically rejected the idea that social security should be financed with general revenues or
tax sources other than the dedicated payroll tax. See I Advisory Council Report, at 18 & n.6.
But see Bush Reserving $1 Trillion for Social Security; Recognizes Privatization Transition
Costs, 28 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 791, 791 (2001) (noting that President Bush has proposed
to carve out a $1 trillion reserve from budget surplus over the next 10 years that could be used
to fund Social Security reform"); Andrew W. Samwick, The Effects of Social Security on Private
Pensions, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 00-17 10(Dec.
2000) (noting that many of the partial privatization proposals would use the federal budget
surplus to partially fund the individual accounts); Andrew B. Lyon & John L. Stell, Analysis of
Current SocialSecurity Reform Proposals, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 473, 47J (describing transfers from
general revenues proposed in three recent reform plans); Robert H. Binstock, Public Policies on
Aging in the Twenty-First Century, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 311, (1998) (offering general
revenues as possible source of funding for social security and rejecting argument that use of
general revenues would stigmatize the program as welfare and thus erode its wide base of
popular support).
331 I Advisory Council Report, at 12, stating:
[F]rom now on many young workers and workers of future generations under
present law will be paying over their working lifetimes employee and
employer taxes that add to considerably more than the present value of their
of their anticipated benefits. This is the inevitable result of a pay-as-you-go
system such as the United States has had, and an aging population.
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outset, the system would not face a long-term funding deficit as the result of
the current aging of the population: current and future retiree benefits would
not depend on current and future worker contributions. The current system,
however, is a mature pay-as-you go system, and there is no costless or magical
way to eliminate the current deficit. Reform is difficult and requires that hard
choices be made."
The United States cannot sit back and wait for an easy solution to social
security's long-term funding difficulties. There is none. Instead, the United
States must make hard choices, and the sooner the better.337
3" See also DIFFERENT APPROACHES, supra note 3, at 9. U.S. Gen. Acc. Off., Social
Security: Restoring Long-Term Solvency Will Require Difficult Choices (GAO/T-HEHS-98-95
Feb. 1998) ("No matter what shape Social Security reform takes, restoring long-term solvency
will require some combination of benefit reductions and revenue increases.").
11 See id. U.S. Gen. Acc. Off., Social Security: Different Approaches for Addressing
Program Solvency 23 (GAO/HEHS-98-33 July 1998), stating:
most analysts believe that early action to reduce the actuarial imbalance is
important for a number of reasons. First, the longer action to address the
program's financing problem is delayed, the larger the per-year cost of the
solution because the shortfall in revenues will still have to be addressed, but
over a shorter period of time. Second, some of the possible solutions to the
solvency problem-such as raising the program's NRA, reducing benefits for
future beneficiaries, or increasing the program's advance funding-will take
time to implement or phase in, once enacted. Third, if certain changes,
especially those that reduce benefits, are made, workers will need time to
adjust their saving and retirement goals to help mitigate the personal impacts
of these changes. Thus, the sooner the changes are made, the less disruptive
they are likely to be.
THE ERISA INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, supra note 322, at 24, stating:
Indeed, the greatest risk to the current system would be the failure of
Congress to act soon to address the program's financial difficulties, since as
time passes the tax increases and/or benefit reductions required to bring the
Social Security program into balance are expected to get larger. Moreover,
many workers and the voluntary employer-sponsored plans in which they
participate will require long lead times to adjust to significant changes in the
Social Security program.
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